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ABSTRACT
One of the underlying themes in American politics is that the addition of campaign
finance laws at the presidential election level will have a negative relationship with amount of
influence and money in campaigns and the amount of regulation. In other words, as regulation
goes up the amount of money and influence will decrease. However, with the recent 2004
presidential election this concept has surely been shown to be problematic, at least at the outset.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine this relationship and to further expand upon the limited
knowledge of this sub-field of political science. This thesis will suggest that the intended result
of campaign finance reform may not necessarily be realized. Subsequently, we must ask
ourselves whether or not campaign finance regulations actually result in the intended
consequences. Federal campaign finance laws do not necessarily reduce the amount of money
and influence by special interests in presidential elections. In examining presidential campaign
finance regulations do higher levels of regulations really have an impact upon the amount of
money (influence) collected and spent in a particular campaign?
The McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Act of 2002 (officially implemented in 2002),
or the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), was a rudimentary attempt to dramatically
change the electoral system in terms of money. In fact, this bill was the most comprehensive
overhaul of the electoral system in a quarter of a century (at least since the 1970’s) and one of
the underlying reasons, arguably, for the bill was to limit soft money and interest group
contributions to presidential candidates or to the presidential campaigns during a given election
cycle. Basically, the attempt was made to limit the “money” in politics and particularly in
iii

presidential campaigns. However, as most media outlets have claimed (such as CNN) that
money or contributions given by individuals and various organizations and the amount of money
spent by each campaign (President Bush and Senator Kerry) in the most recent presidential
election of 2004 surpassed that of any previous presidential election cycle. Part of the reasoning
for the limitation of soft money in presidential elections is the whimsical “myth” that more
money in presidential elections will inevitably lead to more influence of the executive branch by
big time donors such as labor unions, business, wealthy persons, and by interest groups to name
just a few. In other words, wealthy interests such as those mentioned in the previous sentence,
would theoretically have a greater impact on the electoral process than by individuals. This
concept is briefly examined.
Of course, the data will come from many sources with government resources being the
dominant resource. The FEC began collecting campaign finance data since the 1970’s and much
of the data comes from published data files from the FEC. Additionally, data will be taken from
other government resources such as the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S Bureau of Labor
statistics. Other data contained within in this will be properly noted.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The subject of campaign finance reform can often be a dull, monotonous, and tedious
subject for many scholars to examine but the rules of the game can often determine or partially
influence the final outcome. In other words, the rules of the electoral system can have an impact
upon who (or what type of candidate) gets elected and this remains especially true in the realm of
campaign finance. It then becomes important for scholars of political science to gain further
knowledge upon this subject in order that our understanding of elections can become apparent
and that we can better understand the ramifications of pushing through certain campaign finance
policies. This thesis will further expand upon the existing knowledge on the campaign finance
sub-field of American politics in that it will show the relationship between campaign finance
regulations on the presidential level and between the amount of money in these campaigns. Not
enough time has elapsed after the implementation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA) to fully understand the full ramifications and consequences of this important piece of
legislation, primarily because this process is currently evolving or transforming into something
new, but the immediate ramifications can further expand the knowledge of political science.
Also, recent corruption scandals within Congress has created a scenario in which the
basic reaction is to create further regulations but the question must be asked, whether or not
adding to campaign finance regulations will actually reduce the amount of corruption. In other
words, do campaign finance laws at the presidential level actually work or accomplish their
intended goals or do they just change the rules of the game thereby creating drastic unintended
consequences? Clearly the BCRA did not reduce the amount of money within the presidential
nomination system. Some perceive that the vast amounts of money within presidential politics is
1

synonymous with corruption but this notion may not necessarily be accurate as the empirical
evidence suggests that corruption is not necessarily a result of greater amounts of campaign
contributions. The purpose of this thesis is not to categorically state that corruption from
campaign finance does not exist as there are many documented cases (some are stated in the next
section) but that increased campaign contributions or expenditures do not necessarily mean that
political corruption also increases. Furthermore, campaign finance regulations at the presidential
level clearly do not reduce the funding of campaigns.
Pluralist theory argues that society, in particular American society, has a number of
diverging groups who compete for the realization of particular interests. In other words, it is
expected that that a number of divergent groups will compete through competition and dialogue
for the accomplishment of their particular goal. In this sense competition (or conflict) is not bad
and presidential campaign finance is one vehicle for the accomplishment for a true pluralistic
society. The common good of society can be realized, according to pluralism, after dialogue and
conflict have been realized through compromise and concession. The main purpose of this thesis
is to show the presidential campaign finance is one avenue for the compromise and concession to
occur. Additionally, no one particular asset (such as money in campaign finance) can account
for “excessive power” within society and different groups or interests mobilize pressure points
within an overall power structure under what Robert Dahl calls a “polyarchy” 1 . Under this
assumption, minimal economic inequalities between candidates will not necessarily result in
drastic changes to voting patterns if the basic idea of normative democratic theory is accepted.
This thesis will attempt to show that campaign finance reforms will not necessarily result in their
intended outcomes. If the idea of pluralism (and hyper-pluralism described in Chapter Two) is
accepted then campaign finance regulations may not necessarily reduce the level of competition
2

(conflict) and dialogue within society. In other words, pluralism will still exist in some form
even if campaign finance contributions were completely eliminated. One of the purposes of this
thesis is to show that increased levels of campaign finance will not necessarily reduce the levels
of outside influence and this phenomenon should be taken into account by scholars examining
the purposes and consequences of campaign finance reform.
One purpose of this thesis is to examine this relationship and to further expand the
limited knowledge of this sub-field. Additionally, this thesis will suggest that the intended result
of campaign finance reform will not necessarily have the intended consequences that reformers
seek. We must ask ourselves whether or not campaign finance regulations actually have the
intended consequences those who propose reforms intended. Federal campaign finance laws
may not necessarily reduce the amount of money and influence by special interests in
presidential elections. In examining presidential campaign finance regulations do higher levels
of regulations really have an influence upon the amount of money (influence) collected and spent
in a particular campaign?
In comparing aggregate level data it is hypothesized that regulation of presidential
campaign finances will have an inverse relationship with reductions in the money contributed.
The thesis will then focus upon this phenomenon in that one of the primary reasons behind
federal campaign finance laws is to reduce the influence of special interests within presidential
campaign finances (through monetary terms) but this thesis will show that this may not be
necessarily so. My hypothesis is one that examines this relationship between money in
presidential campaigns and finance laws. Again, I am starting with the assumption that federal
campaign finance laws do not necessarily reduce the amount of money and influence by special
interests in presidential elections.
3

Overview of Contemporary Campaign Finance Issues
In comparing American presidential election campaigns, those elections having more
campaign finance laws will be at least just as likely to have relatively higher levels of money
spent during the execution of the campaign than those having less campaign finance laws. One of
the underlying themes in American politics is that the addition of campaign finance laws or
regulations at the presidential election level will have a negative relationship with the amount of
influence and money in campaigns; and the amount of regulation. In other words, as regulation
goes up the amount of money and influence will decrease, in theory. However, with the recent
2004 presidential election this concept has surely been shown to be problematic, at least at the
outset. Clearly, the independent variable in this case would be campaign finance laws in that the
conventional sentiment is that more campaign finance laws will directly have an effect upon the
amount of money spent during a campaign. Put in another manner, campaign finance laws have
an effect upon the amount of money spent during a presidential campaign. Money, then, is the
dependent variable in this hypothesis.
Surely, there are many intervening factors that can have an effect upon this relationship
and some of these intervening variables will become apparent later on in this research. However,
some possible intervening variables that must be examined and controlled for at the outset of the
research are as follows: inflation (a thousand dollars is not worth as much as it used to be),
population growth (if more people are in the general population then the amount of money in a
campaign may also increase), the level of marginal elections (a campaign may be more likely to
spend more money in a close election than an election that essentially is blowout like the 1988
presidential election in which President H.W. Bush easily defeated Michael Dukakis), and the
condition of the economy (individuals, corporations, and the various other interest groups may
4

be more willing to contribute more money to campaigns either directly through hard or soft
money or indirectly through third party groups if the economy is relatively in a good condition).
This is not an exhaustive list of possible intervening factors, but as stated before these
variables will perhaps have the greatest influence upon the association between money
contributed and campaign finance reform; more than other intervening variables. However,
other intervening variables will become apparent during the execution of this thesis.
Also, the politics surrounding campaign finance reform can create difficulties for the
proper implementation of campaign finance reform. Low public salience, partisanship, and the
goals of politicians may create a scenario in which real campaign finance reform is highly
unlikely. As given in the history of campaign finance section of this chapter, changes to
campaign finance regulations typically occur during or directly after dramatic campaign finance
or lobbying scandal. However, some campaign reform efforts may occur in between scandals as
evidenced by the recent implementation BCRA. Nevertheless, public sentiment may create the
proper political environment favorable to campaign finance reform. In other words, changes in
public sentiment may change the likelihood that legislators will adopt campaign finance reform.
Hence, I am only suggesting that political scandals may increase the likelihood for reform; but
that reform can occur during non-scandal periods of time as well.
The McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Act of 2002 (officially implemented in 2002),
or the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), was a rudimentary attempt to dramatically
change the electoral system in terms of money. In fact, this bill was the most comprehensive
overhaul of the electoral system in a quarter of a century (at least since the 1970’s) and one of
the underlying reasons, arguably, for the bill was to limit soft money and third party
contributions to presidential candidates or to their campaigns during a given election cycle.
5

Basically, the attempt was made to limit the “money” in politics and particularly in presidential
campaigns. However, as most media outlets have claimed that money or contributions given by
individuals and various organizations and the amount of money spent by each campaign
(President Bush and Senator Kerry) in the most recent presidential election (2004) surpassed that
of any previous presidential election cycle. Part of the reasoning for the limitation of soft money
in presidential elections is the whimsical “myth” that more money in presidential elections will
inevitably lead to more influence on the executive branch by big time donors such as labor
unions, business, wealthy persons, and by interest groups to name just a few. In other words,
wealthy interests such as those mentioned in the previous sentence, would theoretically have a
greater influence on public policy than ordinary individuals.
One of the underlying themes of this report is to show that this “myth” or perception can
be discredited. However, the dominant theme or thesis will be that federal campaign finance
laws have not and will not fully achieve or accomplish their preferred goals or their original
intent. This is not to say that federal campaign finance laws in regards to presidential elections
do not work, rather they may work at some level but these laws will most likely contain
unintended consequences. Once completed, the examination will show both through quantitative
and qualitative analysis that money will continue to have an effect upon the presidential election
system, but that this effect cannot be eliminated through rudimentary campaign finance laws and
the only true method to eliminate or reduce the effect of money on presidential elections would
be to take drastic action that some could deem undemocratic such as the elimination of
television, radio or internet, and other advertising in terms of the ability of campaigns and any
possible colluding third party individuals or groups.
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Perhaps, a balloon effect is taking place in the presidential campaign finance in that when
an individual or something squeezes a partially inflated balloon the air within the balloon is
displaced and the result does not inherently reduce the air within that balloon. Instead, the air is
displaced from a particular area of the balloon to another area of the balloon. This may be what
is happening within the realm of presidential campaign finance. Campaign finance laws have
not reduced the amount of money in presidential elections; instead the money is only pushed
from one particular area (where the money can more easily be regulated or at the very minimum
tracked by scholars) to another area. According to this school of though, campaign finance laws
will not necessarily reduce or eliminate the influence of certain special interests. After all,
campaign finance laws are put into place to primarily reduce this influence by special interests
but as stated before these laws can have an unintended consequence thereby creating a whole
new presidential election system in which money and special interests are effectively given a
new role within the scope of this system.
Within this same school of thought is the notion that political money is “hydraulic”
because of the following two reasons: first, political money is similar to water in that one cannot
simply get rid of water (in the liquid form) and it always has to go somewhere such as a river that
is dammed; second, campaign money is part of a broader environment in which scholars must
examine the overall system to fully understand the implications of a change in the overall
presidential campaign system 2 .

Potential reformers of the current political presidential

campaign system typically argue that money within the scope of the American system influences
the overall system, thereby potentially influencing the outcome. If we assume this to be true,
then simply increasing the amount of regulation within the system will not necessarily dilute or
reduce the amount of money within the system. Because, those interests that are currently within
7

the scope of the system by attempting to influence the system will continue their attempt at
influence no matter what the “regulatory regime” 3 . Furthermore, the attempt to further
regulation within campaign finance simply may move the money into areas in which no control
may be exerted and this partially came to fruition after the 2002 BCRA as the amount of
resources dramatically increased from third party interests and groups. Additionally, Issacharoff
and Karlan came to the conclusion during a quantitative analysis of campaign finance (on all
levels including the presidential, congressional, and state levels) that the amount of money
within campaigns is greatest whenever the political system moves away from particular
candidates and parties. Partially because campaign politics are pushed towards issue advocacy
by groups that are not necessarily a part of the party and coalitional politics 4 . It must be noted,
that this solely refers to the American political system, and not other political systems with
different political structures.
Additionally, this premise heavily relies upon basic theoretical assumptions regarding
pluralism, hyper-pluralism and participatory democracy. One of the underlying assumptions
made about campaign financing is that individual members within a democratic society can
contribute to the overall political system by contributing financial support, along with other
resources, to campaigns. These contributions are partially a result of conflicts that are a part of
democratic societies. E.E. Shattschneider postulates that democratic government thrives off of
conflict, and that the socialization of conflict expands the scope of conflict 5 . This socialization of
conflict occurs partially because society contains certain universal ideas (such as equality,
justice, liberty and freedom) that influence certain conflicts. In time of these conflicts move into
the public domain due to a need to expand the scope of the conflict from the private realm into
the public realm 6 . This theoretical assumption adds to the argument against presidential
8

campaign finance reform simply because the addition of presidential finance regulations will not
necessarily reduce the socialization of conflicts that are inherently contained within democratic
societies. In other words, greater regulation will not necessarily reduce socialized conflicts
within society because these conflicts will still permeate society in some form. This, of course,
is based wholly on the assumption that campaign contributions are a result of these socialized
conflicts within democratic societies. Money, then, is only part of the socialized conflict
equation and greater levels of campaign finance regulations will only change the overall conflict
equation but will not necessarily reduce the amount of influence in presidential campaigns in
terms of monetary contributions. Put another way, if all monetary contributions to presidential
campaigns were fully abolished, socialized conflicts would not simply decline or fade away;
instead these conflicts would manifest themselves in a different form.
Given the previously mentioned premise, pluralistic democratic societies exhibit certain
assumptions that can help explain certain campaign finance phenomena. First, direct democracy
(such as those given by Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson) theories assume that society is ruled by
the people (self-rule) in that a semblance of “popular participation in decision making” occurs
during the governing process 7 . Under this idea of democracy, most entities within society
participate through voting or some other process in which the “common good” is achieved
through the “common will” (Rousseau’s assumption in “The Social Contract”). A degree of
ssumed rational thought then occurs.
Robert Dahl developed the notion that true democracy cannot be fully achieved in the
real world once the maximation realization is taken into account using the following concepts:
popular sovereignty, political equality, and majority rule 8 . The American “hybrid” system
contains elections and competition between individuals and groups (or political parties) within
9

society that inherently separates this system of polyarchy from a dictatorial form of government
in which a minority group has an effective role in government 9 . However, participation within
the American system does continue to remain abnormally low, especially when compared to
other countries. However, Dahl’s conception of democracy is that popular sovereignty (rule by
the people) and political equality are essential tenets of democracy 10 . However, the degree to
which participation and majoritarian rule occur in the American society may not be at an ideal
point but it does exist to some extent.
Theodore J. Lowi, on the other hand gives an account of the American political system
that is somewhat different. Lowi suggests that power structure within the American system may
not necessarily be pluralist in nature as some policy areas may contain true pluralism but other
policy areas contain or are characterized by certain elitist structures that inherently gives some
groups greater power and influence in certain policy areas 11 . Basically, some policy areas are
pluralistic while other policy areas are controlled by a few elites. Also, under Lowi’s typology
the federal government has created policies that are geared toward established interest groups
such as through subsidies and policies that contain ambiguous language 12 . Basically, this
suggests that some policies and policy areas are intentionally geared to favor certain interest
groups over others thereby creating some policy areas that are dominated by the few. Obviously,
one of the tenets of campaign finance reform is to potentially reduce this inequality and to
change some federal policies especially those policies that particularly favor one interest group
over another.
However, pluralism takes this concept of democracy (as given by E.E. Schattschneider,
Robert A. Dahl and Seymour Martin Lipset) and concludes that this may not occur all of the
time, partially because democratic societies contain multiple groups (such as interest groups,
10

various civic groups, business and labor organizations, etc.) or entities that compete for power 13 .
Without attempting to over analyze the theory, one of the central components of political
pluralism in the U.S. is the two-party system, in which various interests and groups make use of
the two main political parties in their attempts to influence or gain access to the political process.
In theory, groups and interests in American society attempt to gain power and influence by
contributing monetary contributions (as well as other resources) to presidential campaigns. The
attempt to limit this particular method, by campaign finance reformers will, not necessarily result
in less pluralism within society. Why? Simply because groups (or individuals) attempt to expand
(according to E.E. Schattschneider) the scope of conflict whenever it becomes advantageous for
groups to do so and simply raising the amount of campaign finance regulation will not reduce the
necessity or the drive to expand the scope of conflict. Basically, in democratic societies groups,
individuals, and interests attempt to influence government (presumably for their rational self
interests) and the contribution of monetary resources to presidential campaigns is only one
method of influence. Put another way, raising the levels of presidential campaign finance will
not reduce the levels of outside influence by individuals and groups. Presumably, reformers of
presidential campaign finance laws base their actions on the presumption that they are attempting
to reduce the amount of external influence upon the candidates and thus government itself. But,
if pluralist and hyper-pluralists are correct then simply raising the levels of campaign finance
reform (more regulation) will not result in less influence by outside groups because of the
demand to expand the scope of conflict and to redress government in democratic societies.
Furthermore, Robert Dahl (1961) proposes that in the American democratic political
system any group of citizens (interest groups) can influence politicians as long as a competitive
system is in place 14 . Also within this new paradigm another supposition becomes apparent.
11

Politicians in a competitive democratic system must indeed look outside of the political elite or
power elite if they wish to substantially remain in office 15 . Certainly, it would be agreeable if
the varying groups within a democratic society were relatively equal in terms of power,
resources and influence but neo-pluralists concede that this grand scenario is highly unlikely to
occur in any measurable degree. With this assumption being made it becomes apparent that
political elites often must expand their quest well beyond the power elite and the need to raise
presidential campaign finances is only one method to expand beyond the power elite. This thesis
shall show that raising the amount of campaign finance regulations will not necessarily reduce
the need to look beyond the power elite. Simply because, as pluralists and neo-pluralists would
categorically state, a competitive democratic society demands that the political elite (elected
politicians in this particular case) expand their horizons to include groups of citizens no matter
how this can be defined. Basically, pluralism (or neo-pluralism) categorically finds that
democratic societies have many “access points” in which groups of citizens can influence the
political elite and in which the political elite must look outside of the power elite 16 . Simply
getting rid of one access point (in this case campaign finance assuming that all presidential
campaign finance was totally abolished which in theory is very complicated in the American
system) will not necessarily reduce the total amount of any external influences upon the
presidential electoral system.
Historical Background
I begin this discussion with a brief overview of the history of campaign finance reform in
the United States at the national level to give the reader a basic frame of understanding. It is
important to understand that campaign finance reform issues were not always central to
American politics mainly because the current electoral system is dramatically different than the
12

first American electoral system. For example, many offices in the 17th and early 18th centuries
were either non-elected or not contested especially when compared to current offices at the
national level. 17 Also, the electorate had an upper class bias due to voting restrictions such as
provisions requiring ownership of land. Clearly, those candidates running for office only had to
appeal to a very small constituency thereby reducing the need for greater electoral resources.
When George Washington ran for a position in the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1757 the
electorate only consisted of 391 individuals all of which owned property, were male and were
white 18 . This is not to say that electoral resources such as money were not needed as electoral
resource clearly were needed but the demand for such resources was minimal. For example,
George Washington spent 39 pounds for 160 gallons of rum (in the election mentioned above) in
the attempt to persuade voters. 19 Basically, the issue of campaign finance reform was not salient
and/or needed in the traditional American electoral system.
Over time, the system began to evolve, especially in the 1820’s, to a more competitive
system thereby increasing a need for greater electoral resources. Bradley Smith concluded that
Martin Van Buren began the first true popular mass campaign in the campaign of 1828 partially
because Van Buren, in an attempt to appeal to larger number of voters, created a campaign that
spread out to various media outlets such as newspapers and pamphlets 20 . This can be partially
attributed to changes in the electoral system that occurred around the same time as the 1828
campaign in which the electorate began to dramatically grow mainly due to population growth
and the abolition of some property requirements for voters in some of the states 21 . After this
period, presidential elections required greater amounts of electoral resources. Still, the demand
for campaign finance reform at the national level remained minimal because many of the
candidates maintained a high level of self sustainability (they self-financed many parts of their
13

campaigns) and the contributions that were given were contributed by a relatively small number
of people or groups. However, this would change over time as the American electoral system
began to slowly evolve to become more complex.
The first real attempt at campaign finance reform came under the Pendleton Act of 1883
that created the United States Civil Service Commission (currently called the Office of Personnel
Management) 22 . Before the Pendleton Act most government jobs were allotted based upon the
“spoils” system in which officeholders and government contractors were essentially expected to
donate a certain percentage of their income to dominant political actors; in exchange those
political actors gave them patronage positions. By one estimate, about 90 percent of (around
1839) Republican and Democrats congressional committee income was accrued through this
spoils system 23 . The Pendleton Act eliminated the spoils system and most government jobs then
became civil service in which the employees were appointed primarily based upon merit and not
patronage. The assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled “office seeker” allowed for
the right circumstances for the implementation of the Pendleton Act 24 . Additionally, once the
Pendleton Act was fully implemented the political parties began to lose revenue from the
assessments. Therefore, the parties began to look elsewhere for supplementary revenue and
wealthy individuals contributed a large percentage of that supplementary income. The era of
massive contributions by individuals, corporations or other entities began, thereby producing a
need of campaign finance regulation.
Due to increasing amounts of contributions to political campaigns by corporations or
other entities the Tillman Act was passed in 1907 that effectively banned money contributions by
corporations and other entities to political campaigns at the federal level (to include the
President, Vice President and members of Congress both in the Senate and House). This
14

included national banks and other corporations that were formed through the authority of
Congress. An example of this occurred in the McKinley election in 1896 as McKinley spent
between $6-$7 million dollars in his campaign bid and consequently it was revealed that his
campaign accepted questionable contributions from insurance firms 25 . This ban on financial gifts
to candidates at the federal level by corporations, national banks and other entities formed by the
authority of Congress still remains intact today. However, the effects of the Tillman Act on
presidential campaigns remained limited because the legislation lacked any provision for
enforcement.
Also, the Supreme Court in the 1921 case United States V. Newberry (256 U.S. 232)
ruled that the amendments to the Tillman Act were not applicable because parties and primaries
were not directly mentioned in the Constitution for this specific purpose. Also, Congress at that
time did not believe that it had full authority over state and local jurisdictions therefore they did
not fully enforce the provisions on state and local party apparatuses. This allowed for state and
local parties to funnel money into federal elections without any prohibition or disclosure
requirements partially because the Publicity Act and the Supreme Court decision in United States
V. Newberry did not specifically dictate enforcement provisions. Instead leaving the language
was left ambiguous 26 .
In an attempt to reduce campaign corruption, the Federal Corruption Practices Act was
first enacted in 1910 but was severely limited by the courts and it only vaguely applied to House
or Senate candidates and lacked adequate enforcement provisions. Basically, this Act required
federal candidates to reveal certain financial disclosures. Due to the serious weakness of this
legislation and partially because of the Teapot Dome Scandal, Congress added amendments in
1925 to give it greater enforcement capabilities and to close certain loopholes (one loophole was
15

that candidates only reported personal expenditures and did not report spending by political
committees). Additionally, money could be funneled through state and local party mechanisms.
An excellent example of this is that the Democratic Party in 1936 created a book for their
national convention that had favorable articles or descriptions of their candidates in which they
sold advertising space in the books for $2,500 and sold the books to members of the convention
thereby raising over $250,000 (1936 dollars) for their party and this practice continued (by both
parties) until 1972 (See pg 27 27 ).
Around the same time, Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats feared certain
provisions of the New Deal. Therefore the Hatch Act of 1939 (Senator Hatch of New Mexico-a
Democrat) was formed to prohibit federal employees from engaging in partisan political
activities 28 . Interestingly, this Act was used in the 2004 presidential election when the National
Aeronautical Space Agency employees took photos of Senator John Kerry (the infamous
unflattering photo of him in a white jumpsuit) when he visited the Kennedy Space Center and the
United States Office of Special Counsel ordered that the photos be taken down at the NASA
facility because it was viewed that the employees at NASA, being federal employees, engaged in
political activity while on duty via the posting of the photos at the government facility.
Around the same time (in the mid 19th century), Republicans feared the rising political
clout of unions and union membership as most of their support went to the Democratic Party.
Therefore, they passed the Smith-Connally Act (sometimes called the Smith Connally AntiStrike Act or the Labor Disputes Act) in the attempt to stop the ever increasing dominance of the
unions. President Roosevelt vetoed this legislation but Congress overrode that veto. Basically
this legislation prevented unions from making financial contributions in federal elections and it
allowed the federal government to seize and operate certain industries that were important to the
16

war effort (W.W.II) and were threatened by union strikes. However, this Act did not prevent
union members from federal campaign activity as lawyers for the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) interpreted the law to apply to contributions to candidates. Therefore unions
could make contributions that were not directed to candidates and the subsequent effect of this
legislation was the exact opposite of the original intention as it created a legal arena for
contributions to federal candidates by unions thereby increasing the financial clout of unions 29 .
As a result, the Republican Party formulated and passed the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 by
overriding the veto of President Harry Truman. Many of the provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act
related to labor practices but it also rigorously limited certain political activities of unions
including the communication by unions to their members about to political activities such as the
endorsement of a particular candidate. Naturally, many unions opposed this legislation and the
CIO published an endorsement of a democratic candidate forcing the government to bring an
indictment against the union in United States v. CIO. Obviously, the court found that unions
could communicate with their members and this legislation marks an important tipping in that it
was found that Congress attempted to not only limit campaign contributions but they also
attempted to limit political speech. Nevertheless the government attempted a second time to
bring a case against the unions in United States v. United Auto Workers in which the Supreme
Court returned the issue to the district court on procedural rules and the district court acquitted
the unions. The steel unions subsequently decided to strike during the Korean War conflict in
which President Truman decided that a strike at that particular time could be a risk to national
security because of the need for steel for the war effort. Therefore, he ordered the seizure of
some steel factories by government soldiers and ordered the CEO to operate the mills under
government supervision with the explicit intent on stopping the impending strike. However, the
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Supreme Court in Youngstown v. Sawyer decided to limit the executive power during wartime
and to “reconcile” some congressional policies that were in conflict 30 .
Despite the increased amounts of contributions and campaign spending from 1900-1940’s
the relative amount was kept to a moderate level. Some scholars speculate that campaign finance
was kept to these levels due to the Great Depression and W.W.II. 31 . This changed in 1952 when
the government ended a freeze on new television stations thereby allowing for the greater growth
in the need for political campaigns to use this new medium. Campaign spending increased
dramatically from the 1951-1952 presidential election cycle to the 1975-1976 election cycle in
which spending was around $140 million during the former election cycle to about $540 million
in the latter election cycle 32 . Additionally, the dramatic growth in campaign spending did not
stop in the 1970’s when campaign finance reforms were passed and put into practice.
The 1970’s saw a dramatic increase in the desire to stem the tide of perceived political
campaign finance corruption. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was passed in 1971
that effectively replaced the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910 in the attempt to increase the
various disclosures of federal campaign finance contributions and eliminated some of the
loopholes and failures that were associated with the old Federal Corruption Practices Act.
Additionally, penalties were put into place for failure to properly adhere to the provisions of the
legislation thereby increasing enforcement, which the first legislation lacked. Furthermore, the
early 1970’s saw the development of the Watergate scandal which inevitably changed many
things in Washington, D.C. and FECA was a product of this. Immediately after FECA was
created and put into force the Watergate scandal occurred thereby allowing for a situation in
which public support for greater levels of campaign finance reform increased dramatically.
Basically, the Nixon administration took the position that they did not have to give full
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disclosures because FECA did not specifically state whether or not contributions made before the
effective date of FECA and the last required filing of the old Federal Corrupt Practices Act had
to be disclosed 33 .
Eventually, the Nixon administration was forced to give full disclosure (in 1973) which
showed that his committee received approximately $11 million primarily by corporations and
other financiers 34 . Most of these contributions (approximately $10 million) to the Nixon
campaign that were given before the full activation of FECA before it was revealed that illegal
corporate contributions were partially used to help fund the Watergate break-in and subsequent
cover up 35 . Due to the public perception of corruption amendments to FECA were passed in
1974 that created the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). The amendments also created legal
limits on campaign contributions to federal candidates and their political parties, and created
enforcement provisions. Additionally, the 1974 FECA amendments also created partial
taxpayer financing of presidential elections.
However, many opposed this amended legislation claiming constitutional concerns such
as freedom of political speech. In 1976 the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1)
upheld many of the provisions in the amended FECA legislation but overturned other pertinent
provisions. The court upheld the following provisions: public funding for presidential
campaigns that are coupled with voluntary spending limits, a “broader system of disclosure”, and
certain contribution limits 36 . More importantly, the court overturned a couple of key provisions
of the amendments that still reverberates today. For instance, the court overturned mandatory
spending limits by candidates, “limits on funding one’s own campaign”, and placed limits on
independent spending 37 .

Additionally, the court had problems with the vague definition of

political campaign activity and what precise activities should require disclosures. Basically, the
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vague language made it possible to include certain issue advocacy speech that, in theory, should
not be regulated and it possibly could dissuade some potential speakers from public speech in the
fear that they might be prosecuted 38 . Therefore, the court interpreted and decided that it should
only cover “speech that advocated a candidate’s election or defeat” 39 .
For the most part, this new legislation, as amended and interpreted by the Supreme Court,
remained intact until the implementation of the BCRA. However, one minor change occurred in
1978 the FEC decided that national parties could essentially “use a mixture of funds raised
pursuant to the federal limits and funds raised pursuant to state law” to pay for certain activities
such as grass-roots campaign activities 40 . The FEC justified this mixture of funds based on the
theory that party-building activities essentially had an effect upon both the state and national
party apparatuses; therefore a mixture of funds could be used in such activities. Additionally,
Congress amended FECA in 1979 to allow parties to spend unlimited funds that were raised
pursuant to federal rules for grassroots campaigns. These funds that were raised for other
reasons than for the explicit advocacy of the election or defeat of a particular candidate became
known as “soft money”.
Bribery and illegal financial contributions by certain members of Congress became an
issue in 1980 when the FBI set up a sting operation in which they set up a fake enterprise (Abdul
Enterprises, Ltd.) to tape (video and sound) various members of Congress talking and discussing
financial contributions by an Arab Sheik in return for political favors 41 . This scandal is called
ABSCAM, which is named after the fake enterprise. ABSCAM became notorious for the
constitutional issues that arose such as entrapment by law enforcement investigations but this
scandal further solidified the desire, by some, for further regulations concerning contributions to
elected officials. One of the important legacies, in the realm of political corruption, of
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ABSCAM is that corruption is indeed prevalent and the need to combat such practices becomes
necessary for a truly competitive democratic state 42 .
The proposals given in the amended FECA influenced American politics at the national
level and functioned more or less as was intended. However, certain unintended consequences
or results began to slowly occur after the implementation and throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s.
One possible result is the globalization of campaign financial contributions upon American
presidential elections. Allegedly, the quest for a second nomination and win in the general
election by former President Clinton resulted in the taking of illegal campaign contributions from
foreign corporations and governments. The Democratic Party allegedly took in about $300,000
for the re-election bid by Clinton from a foreign entrepreneur for the explicit purpose of granting
favors in contracts for the development of the Caspian Sea oil pipeline 43 . Roger Tamraz, the
entrepreneur mentioned in the previous sentence, testified that he gave the money for explicit
access to the president 44 . The Chinese military also donated money to the Democratic Party for
the re-election bid by President Clinton in 1996 in the attempt to also gain access to President
Clinton 45 . Herbert Alexander found, in his quadrennial studies of election financing, that the
1980 and 1984 presidential election occurred within the bounds of the original intent of FECA
but that by 1996 the original constrains had been circumvented 46 . Basically, political parties and
campaigns circumvented many of the provisions within FECA thereby dramatically reducing its
overall capacity to act effectively in terms of the original intent to reduce corruption in national
elections by reducing the influence of financial contributions. This new circumvention
eventually led to the implementation of the BCRA in an attempt to reduce money and corruption
in national elections.
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The BCRA, passed in 2002, sought to restore contribution limits in the attempt to stop or
reduce “soft money” and to bring back disclosure requirements. Additionally, the law adjusted
contribution limits that were originally put into place back in the 1970’s. Another interesting
aspect of the BCRA is the attempt to regulate non-partisan issue ads paid for by soft money
donated by corporations and unions. Naturally, this new regulation on issue advocacy ads raised
concerns among some that freedom of speech was being eroded. Therefore, groups like the
California State Democratic Party and the National Rifle Association came together and filed a
lawsuit in an attempt to overturn certain provisions of the BCRA. The Supreme Court in
McConnell v. FEC upheld the controversial provisions in the BCRA ruling, stating that the
provisions were constitutional and the law still remains wholly intact today. It is too soon to
determine the exact implications and consequences of the BCRA as it has only been in effect for
one presidential election cycle but it clearly did not reduce the amount of money in the 2004 race
and it surely did not reduce issue advocacy ads.
Recent Scandals
Recent efforts by some federal lawmakers to raise funds have placed a desire to increase
campaign finance regulations to potentially reduce the perceived corruption. In particular some
members of Congress and their staff have received trips and gifts from a particular lobbyist in
Washington D.C. named Jack Abramoff. Washington lobbyist Jack Abramoff pleaded guilty to
conspiracy, tax evasion, and mail fraud in an agreement with prosecutors to attain more
knowledge and information about other potential individuals, primarily within the scandal
surrounding the Indian Gaming Casino industry and the SunCruz Casinos based in Florida. Only
one member of Congress was actually mentioned in court papers (Rep. Robert W. Ney, R-Ohio)
but the scandal has the potential to expand to others in Congress and to advance the issue of
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campaign finance reform 47 . At issue here is whether or not members of Congress and some of
their staff members received bribes and influence in return for political favors and for legislative
favors. Representative Ney recently relinquished his chairmanship of the House Administration
Committee primarily due to the Abramoff scandal. The agenda within Congress and within the
Executive will surely be influenced by this scandal and House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL)
may have to change his planned agenda for the upcoming election year. Additionally, the
Republicans in the House and Senate recently proposed changes to the restrictions on lobbying
within the nations capitol. The proposed changes involve banning most privately funded trips
and reducing private gifts 48 . However, the likelihood of a complete ban is unlikely as some
unnamed members of Congress are opposed to a complete ban on trips 49 . Basically, the
implication for this scandal may be limited in scope and only time will tell if it has a dramatic
change on the campaign finance system. Dramatic changes like those prompted by other
scandals, such as the Teapot Dome scandal mentioned earlier. Representative Tom Feeney (RFL) made a statement in the Washington Times that the scandal may be limited to the
Washington Beltway. He states: “I don’t get the sense that many people are paying attention”
basically referring to the general electorate 50 . Nevertheless, this scandal may have an impact
upon the 2006 midterm election and to the agenda of both the president and Congress.
Evidence for the changing sentiments among the general population following the Jack
Abramoff scandal suggests that favorability for campaign finance reform, both at the presidential
and congressional levels, is persistently increasing. According to a USA Today/CNN/Gallup
poll taken around January 9, 2006 the current corruption scandal may be a dominant factor in the
midterm 2006 election cycle as 43% of the respondents claimed that corruption was “extremely
important” to voting issues and this is surprising as only 38% claimed that the economy is an
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important factor in voting issues 51 . Additionally, this same poll found that only around 50% of
respondents stated that policies put forth by the Republican leadership in Congress will move the
country in the wrong direction in terms of policy and this is the lowest percentage ranking for the
Republicans since their dramatic takeover in 1994 52 . The relative percentage for Democrats
within Congress remains approximately ten percentage points below the Republicans but the
Democratic ratings are increasing 53 . However, according to the same poll the presidential
approval rating remained about the same as the previous month partially suggesting that the
Abramoff scandal has not had such a dramatic effect, yet, upon the executive branch 54 . The
findings by this poll adds further evidence that public sentiment may force a change in campaign
finance laws in addition to other lobbying regulations.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the presidency will be unharmed by the
recent lobbying and campaign finance scandals, which occur mainly at the congressional level.
The Washington Post-ABC News poll taken between January 23 and January 26, 2006 clearly
shows an overall dissatisfaction with the president in his attempt to deal with ethics in
government as approximately 56% of the respondents gave an overall disapproval response in
this poll and this is about a 7% increase from the 18th of December 2005 55 . Again, this partially
suggests that the president will be affected negatively from the recent lobbying scandals in
Congress. Also, the same poll found that about 46% of the respondents stated that the
Democratic Party will do a better job at standing up to lobbyists and special interest groups while
only 27% of the respondents stated the Republican Party would be the most likely 56 . Clearly the
president may be negatively influenced by the talk of scandals in his party and the general public
may be primed for greater campaign finance reform and to reform lobbying. However, this
conclusion may be questionable as the same poll taken at an earlier date (11/2/2005) shows that
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only about 43% of the respondents stated that overall level of ethics and honesty in the federal
government declined during the Bush presidency and this is the exact same percentage using the
same question a month later 57 . This may suggest that the recent Abramoff scandal may not
necessarily have a dramatic impact upon the presidency. Nevertheless, public opinion and
sentiment clearly shows that the favorability of the current regime may influence the upcoming
midterm elections.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
A modest amount of prior research and thought has been completed on this contentious
issue and some of the aspects of presidential campaign finance need to be examined further too
fully understand the issue. It is important to note that this section primarily involves literature
that pertains to the presidential level as a number of examinations and analysis have been
completed on the state and congressional levels. I begin the literature review analysis by briefly
examining literature on the history of campaign finance reform and regulations. The legal aspect
and scholarly interpretation literature is then briefly examined. This includes the recent
implementation of BCRA. From this point the various theories on campaign finance literature
are briefly reviewed.
Earlier campaign finance reform at the national level primarily focused upon corruption,
equality, and overall dishonesty within elections 58 . These earlier reforms basically were focused
upon reducing the level of inequality among the voters, or at least those who could vote.
However, more recent campaign finance reforms have instead shifted this focus upon voters and
placed a greater emphasis upon electoral campaigns and the individual candidates according to
Ruth S. Jones 59 . This shift in emphasis from actual voters to the campaigns partially contributed
to a greater emphasis upon the individual candidate in terms of reforms and public financing of
federal campaigns is one example of this shift. In theory, greater levels of public financing of
elections should allow more candidates to enter into politics and run for elections because it has
the potential to reduce barriers to entry and potentially reduce corruption as candidates and
campaigns will not be as dependent upon contributions from private individuals and interest
groups. Ruth S. Jones, based upon the previous theory, stated that public financing of elections
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may allow for greater access for minority candidates and minority parties, even above what their
overall percentage of the electorate may be because these candidates will have fewer barriers to
entry 60 . It is important to note here that minority candidates primarily are defined as third party
candidates because of the current two- party system in America. Of course opponents, such as
Ralph Winter, of reform state the opposite and argue that public financing will lead to the
introduction of new biases in the system and will increase the ability of incumbents to retain their
positions because of the conditions usually attached to public financing 61 . Public financing of
elections may also heavily influence the electoral system because it introduces a lot of new rules
that invariably may change the outcome of elections and the rules may be specifically set up to
favor either the status quo or a particular candidate. In other words, public financing of elections
may not necessarily reduce biases, inequalities, and distortions within elections because they
may be set up in such a manner as to give incentives to one side while giving punishments to the
other side mainly through restrictions.
It is generally accepted that recent years have seen a dramatic growth in campaign
spending especially when measured with absolute dollars. However, Ansolabehere, Gerber, and
Snyder analyzed this notion and found that this is not necessarily the case as increases in
campaign spending really has not gone up dramatically when one compares campaign spending
relative to national income 62 . They take these findings to further examine the notion of
corruption and came to a similar conclusion in terms of corruption in that corruption, when
measured by using the aggregate economy (Gross Domestic Product and the Consumer Price
Index) has not really increased in the past twenty five years 63 . These findings are in stark
contrast to the arguments given by pro reformers of campaign finance. After all, corruption is
one of the main driving forces behind campaign finance reform movements. In other words,
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corruption may not be a necessary component for reform; instead reformers should focus upon
inequalities and distortions within the campaign finance system as this would provide more
favorable outcomes. In basic terms, the previous authors found that campaign finance
expenditures have only increased with increases in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Of
course, they acknowledge that the general perception, among the voting population, is that
spending and corruption in campaigns is out of control 64 .
In their analysis of the presidential nomination process, George C. Edwards III and
Stephen J. Wayne, found that federal election law does indeed shape or influence presidential
candidates campaign strategies 65 . In other words, campaign finance regulation at the national
level encourages presidential candidates to act or behave in certain ways. In the same analysis,
Edwards III and Wayne found that the federal election law that was formed throughout the
1970’s produced incentives to create a solidified financial base early in the presidential
nomination process 66 . Implicit in this finding is the notion that candidates who enter the
presidential nomination later on during the nomination process will be less likely to have success
than those candidates who entered the nomination system earlier in the process. Furthermore,
early money is important because it buys recognition for those candidates who are not as
recognizable (such as Ross Perot in 1992). That is, it buys legitimacy because donors, the press,
and other politicians may evaluate the credibility of candidates partially on their financial status.
Moreover, it gives the presidential candidates greater flexibility on how to run their campaigns as
it creates more possible choices 67 .

It is important to note that money itself is not the only

determining factor on who will be successful or not successful within the presidential nomination
system because there have been many outliers that tend to downplay this effect.
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Bradley Smith proposed different criteria to properly examine public financing of
presidential elections. Most scholars focus their efforts mainly upon the concepts of equality and
the reduction of perceived corruption when developing campaign finance regulations that are
publicly financed. The first criterion is administratability, of the extent to which a heavily
regulated campaign finance system creates compliance costs for both the government and the
various political actors 68 . Presumably, a simpler system would be easier to administrate by
government officials and it would reduce the compliance costs of new political actors into the
system. Secondly, the campaign finance system should contain some level of flexibility to easily
adapt to new changes in the political environment 69 . The third criteria is that of opportunity in
that the system should encourage or allow entry into the system by political newcomers or at the
very least not discourage challengers from entering into a campaign 70 . Fourth, in relation to the
third criteria, the system should promote competitiveness thereby increasing basic democratic
principles and the system should not intentionally “insulate” incumbents from challenges 71 .
Finally, the campaign finance system should promote communication 72 . Communication in this
sense refers to the ability of candidates to communicate and educate voters on their particular
platform. Implicit in these criteria as defined by Smith is that government should provide
regulations and funding to accomplish these criteria. For example, the government would have
to under this system provide taxpayer dollars to each campaign for the sole purpose of allowing
them to communicate with potential voters or their constituents.
In theory, if the campaign finance system became (fully) publicly financed then this
would radically alter or change the current system. The current political parties in addition to the
particular candidates would be affected by these changes. Ruth Jones examined changes to state
public finance systems and found that full public financing of the campaign system does indeed
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dramatically alter the overall system in that minority parties gained significant strength in
relation to their position before the changes in the state campaign finance system 73 . This is not
to say the majority parties are somehow disadvantaged; instead minority parties gain
significantly with full public financing of campaigns. Of course, the exact type of system will
determine the exact plausible outcome. Additionally, the determining factor of the outcome may
be influenced by how the funds are collected and allocated in addition to the exact regulations.
In theory, the rules of the game (the regulations) may determine the outcome. This can also be
applied nationally at the presidential level because, presumably, if the current campaign system
were dramatically changed then the outcomes would also presumably change.
The relation between the party and the candidate can often influence behavioral aspects
of the campaign finance system. Richard Briffault argues that this relationship can effectively
create corruption and campaign finance reforms are needed to counteract these negative
effects 74 . Implicit in this line of argument is that political party activities and actions effectively
undermine the intentions of campaign finance reform. However, the only main goal of political
parties according to this argument is for the specific and sole purpose of electing members to
various offices. Any other possible goals are an artifact of the first goal. Reforms at campaign
finance must be made to reduce the influence by political parties and by PAC’s. This reduction,
in turn would effectively reduce potential corruption in campaigns. Reforms, according to this
argument, do not infringe upon the rights of parties or upon their interests; instead it can promote
electoral competition, grassroots campaigns, and “broad-based approaches to the problems of
governance 75 ”. Implicit in this line of reasoning is drastic limitations to the expenditures of both
parties and PAC’s.

30

Another aspect of campaign finance reform revolves around First Amendment policies
that may be affected by such reform. Alan Grant briefly examined some of the plausible affects
of reform upon some constitutional principles 76 . Basically, it is assumed (through interpretations
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v Valeo and McConnell v FEC) that it is necessary to
convey free speech in political campaigns through the various media outlets which inherently
require extreme amounts of funding. Grant argues that many conservatives often view campaign
finance reforms such as the BCRA in 2002 as providing limits on the exercise of free, speech but
this clearly has not fully materialized in the most recent reforms 77 . However, the full effects of
McConnell v FEC will surely be felt on the total federal campaign finance system for some time
to come. But the explicit effects will not be known for some time. Additionally, Grant also
comes to the conclusion that many of the provisions put forth by reformers clearly have
unintended consequences and he briefly compares the American system to the British system in
which funding is not as important due to institutional differences such as no preset term length 78 .
Many scholarly interpretations of campaign finance have been completed such as
J. Tobin Grant and Thomas J. Rudolph as they looked into the relationship between democratic
values and group affect towards the idea of campaign finance and how affect can influence ideas
about campaign finance 79 . Basically, they concluded that public sentiment towards the idea of
campaign finance is largely related on how much reform would affect them in a personal
manner. Put in another manner, some members of the public (both groups and individuals) will
support reform if it favors them in a favorable manner and other members of the public will not
support reform if it does not favor them within a favorable manner 80 . Of course, this conclusion
wholly assumes rational choice by the mass public. Also, Justin Nelson introduced a new way at
looking at campaign finance reform by dividing the concept into two basic categories. First,
31

supply side of campaign finance attempts to “solve” campaign finance by attempting to limit or
stop money in campaigns by limiting private funds within the system. Second, the demand side
attempts to “solve” campaign finance by reducing the demand or desire by politicians for private
funds 81 . Additionally, Nelson proposed that attempts at campaign finance reform have largely
failed because reforms have typically been focused upon the supply side approach with the
premise being that focus upon the supply side approach does not reduce demand by politicians
for private funds and as long as the demand is present the supply will also be available 82 .
There have been many examinations and analytical studies completed on the legal side of
campaign finance reform. Robert F. Bauer fully examined various aspects and discussed an
assortment of legal implications of the BCRA of 2002 in his book titled “More Soft Money Hard
Law” 83 . This text provides scholars with the basic understanding of certain legalities of
campaign finance and gives the reader a basic legal framework of this narrow topic by
effectively clarifying many of the complicated provisions of the BCRA. Additionally, Grant J.
Tobin recently considered the various issues associated with the contemporary campaign
finance 84 . Michael J. Goff in his studies examined the early presidential nomination system
thereby giving the reader a better understanding of the overall nomination system 85 .
Furthermore, Katherine A. Hinckley and John C. Green examined the flow of funds in the
presidential campaign system 86 . Within the realm of certain legalities that surround presidential
campaign finance, Bradley Smith analyzed legal issues of the freedom of speech and campaign
finance reform especially pertaining to equality and concluded that campaign finance reforms
that are based on poor assumptions usually do not have their intended outcomes and they
sometimes exacerbate the problem by allowing for exogenous institutional factors 87 .
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Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel furthered knowledge on campaign finance by
analyzing the various causal effects of various campaign finance reform regulations by
examining the effects on competitiveness and expenditures 88 . One of the major problems with
the current literature on campaign finance reform at the presidential level is that a majority
simply assume that campaign is inherently exogenous to factors such as voter turnout, electoral
competition, and campaign expenditures. Furthermore, Frank J. Sorauf challenged the
traditional line of contemporary thought in that he concludes that the recent campaign finance
efforts have not and will not hurt the Democratic Party as some speculate; instead the current
system contains many ingrained institutions that negated much of the conventional wisdom 89 .
Basically, Sorauf states that there seems to be a disagreement between reality and what is the
perception and that many third party groups, such as Moveon.org, only have exacerbated this
perception. Another radical departure from conventional campaign finance wisdom is the idea
put forth by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres as they proposed a total revamping of the current
campaign finance system in which all donations would be made privately and anonymously 90 .
The idea behind anonymous contributions is that politicians would not be expected to give the
same level of access to big time donors as they currently do because politicians would not
exactly know who donated what to them thereby reducing the pressure to tow the line of large
contributors to campaigns. In other words, contributors would have a harder time of buying
influence over politicians.
Most everyone would agree that presidential campaigns must raise campaigns funds early
in the process in order to be competitive at the national level. Katherine Hinckley and John C.
Green examined some important aspects to fund raising in presidential nomination campaigns.
They developed two distinct models for fundraising listed as follows: “campaign driven”, which
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primarily revolves around the performance (or lack of a performance), of the campaign and the
“organization-driven” models which places an emphasis upon the quality of the candidate’s
political bases and their fundraising efforts 91 . Basically, the campaign driven model is based
upon the school of thought that the progress of campaigns will determine flow of funds into
primary campaigns. In other words, highly publicized or stronger showings earlier in the
campaigns will increase the likelihood for greater amounts of campaign contributions. However,
the organization-driven model is primarily based upon the premise that the fund raising process
on organizational structures or exploitation of candidates political bases 92 . Implicit in this
model is that fund raising essentially begins with a basic pool of contributors that are usually
identified by partisan characteristics (including geography) and the campaign organization must
ask for the money, which is partially done through networking 93 . Of course, other methods of
asking are utilized such as direct mail or through phone contact. Hinckley and Green theorize
that, according to the organizational-driven model, the act of giving money is different from
voting and that organizational fundraising is not susceptible to minor campaign events 94 .
Basically, the motives for donating money may be different than the motives for voting. For
example, individuals may donate for social reasons such as social recognition, business
networking, and personal friendships. Of course, people may vote for similar reasons but there
are often other motives, in addition to the previous motives mentioned, that inspire people to
vote. Basically, money is raised through organizational efforts. To be sure, there are many
possible problems with the two previously mentioned models but they do give us an idea of basic
fundraising characteristics.
It is consistently clear that the general public does not really care about campaign finance
reform (when compared to other issues) in that less than one percent in a 2000 presidential issue
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poll conducted by the Pew Center for People and the Press stated that campaign finance reform
was a major issue 95 . However, the news media often portrays a situation in which the mass
general public is overwhelming in favor of such reform thereby giving a false perception of the
true reality. The general public however, generally does support campaign finance limits but at
the same time they are ambivalent to specific reforms and the subsequent consequences 96 .
William G. Mayer specifically examines public attitudes on campaign finance reform and came
to the conclusion that the variables party identification and ideology really do not matter much,
in terms of statistical significance, on what position(s) they take on campaign finance reform 97 .
This then makes it difficult to really determine who specifically favors furthering campaign
finance reform and who oppose such reforms such as public financing of campaigns. One
possible explanation for the apparent lack of public support for campaign finance reform is that
this issue contains a low degree of issue salience among the mass general public.
Kenneth Mayer proposes an alternative explanation in that he states that there is a lack of
proper media coverage of campaign finance issues as the current coverage frames the issues in
such a manner that it merely makes it impossible among the general public to discern between
true corruption and acceptable levels of “every-day pull and haul of politics” 98 . Basically,
reformers often distort or obfuscate the issues to better support their arguments and the mass
public takes cues from this to make decisions. Mayer found that the campaign finance literature
often contains several fallacies listed as follows: first, that their arguments are structured in such
a way that they cannot be proven wrong, second that they often contain a selection bias as they
do not pick cases in which money could not have determined the outcome or cases in which the
outcome was the reverse of what was expected, third the literature often confuses correlation and
causal factors, and finally that if corruption by money were eliminated that politicians would
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gravitate towards a better outcome 99 . The argument laid out here is that one cannot fully
understand the issues of campaign finance reform until these fallacies are fully taken into
account. Also, the arguments laid out by reformers are often one-sided opinions that do not
necessarily tell the whole story. For example, it may appear that some cases may contain
influences by huge contributors to campaigns in that those contributors get the law changed in
their favor. However, in reality there are often many competing forces that all contribute to the
system to change the law; therefore reformers would only point out that one side gained by
contributing money and subsequently getting the law change. However, reformers often leave
out the other half of the story thereby making it appear as though something occurred when in
reality it did not occur. Of course, one cannot prove or show that the one side who won did so
because of other reasons than contributing large sums of money as those contributions are an
important variable.
It can be very difficult to properly show a relationship or correlation between campaign
contributions and support for legislation by politicians. Frank. J. Sorauf concluded from his
examination of the current literature that this supposed relationship really does not exist with any
great degree of significance both in qualitative and quantitative terms 100 .

Furthering this

argument is the conclusion drawn by John R. Wright in his examination of contributions by
PAC’s to Congress and the effect those contributions had upon the vote choice of the individual
legislator. While this study was extremely confined, he found no correlation between PAC
contributions and voting behavior (in terms on how legislators vote on specific pieces of
legislation) thereby concluding that of the many different variables that potentially have an effect
upon legislator vote choice, campaign finance contributions by PAC’s should not be considered
to have that great of an effect 101 . Taking this same line of thought, perhaps variables such as
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party cues and party discipline play a greater role upon the individual legislator vote choice.
Also, going back to Sorauf’s argument, it may be empirically difficult to determine whether
campaign finance contributions has influence upon politicians or whether those contributions are
given because particular politicians may be favorable to their position 102 . Generally speaking
and as a generic example, it would be very difficult to explain why the National Rifle
Association (NRA) would want to give campaign contributions to an avid anti-gun candidate
because this candidate would presumably make it harder to accomplish the goals of the NRA.
Of course, one possible explanation may be that individuals and groups are only attempting to
gain “access” to individual politicians and the political process. Finally, examinations into
contributions are problematic in that one can attribute contributions and try to influence
whichever side won the battle.
Reformers of campaign finance often take the position that soft money contributions to
candidates inherently causes corruption and one way to reduce this corruption is to reduce the
amounts of soft money. Presumably, parties are supposed to use these funds for party building
activities but they often use the funds to support particular candidates. However, soft money can
be healthy for a democracy in that parties mobilize voters and increase political education or
political knowledge levels among the mass public. Ray La Raja concluded from his analysis of
the 1998 elections that banning all soft money is not the best reform to take, as it can potentially
reduce political participation by the mass public, which is a necessary condition for a healthy
democracy, by reducing the resources available to parties 103 . Instead, Ray La Raja proposes that
only a cap be placed upon soft money contributions as the best possible reform as it would
reduce potential corruption by large donors and because the parties would retain the ability to
mobilize voters and to encourage participation 104 . Basically, he argues soft money in
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moderation is healthy for democracy and the abolition of such resources would, overall, be
harmful and the best possible solution is to place caps upon soft money contributions as this
would eliminate potential corruption from large donors yet it would still allow certain party
building activities that help to raise the level of participation, mobilization, and political
knowledge of the mass public.
The next question that invariably arises is whether or not contributing money to political
campaigns is considered to be actual political participation. One school of thought argues that
greater participation is healthy for a democracy and it contains a positive connotation. If one
prescribes to this line of thought then campaign finance reforms should be created in such a way
as to increase participation in campaigns and one way to do this is to reduce barriers for
contributions to campaigns. However, as Clyde Wilcox points out, participation in democracies
(particularly in the United States) is often unequal in that only a relatively small number of
people vote and even a smaller number of individuals contribute to campaigns 105 . Additionally,
the views of these donors may be different than the general population thereby creating an
inequity in society by theoretically giving donors greater access and potential influence 106 .
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) argue that participation may also be skewed in society
because of the availability of resources among the general populace with the premise being that
those individuals who have greater levels of wealth are more likely to contribute money to
political campaigns thereby raising their level of participation while those with less wealth are
less likely to donate to campaigns 107 .
Basically, donors are given greater access to the political process thereby creating a
situation in which certain ideas are presented to the policymakers with the explicit exclusion of
other ideas. Also, Verba et al. concluded that even though these donors on average only gave a
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relatively small amount (about $75 in 1995), this created a significant distortion (participation) in
favor of wealthier individuals who are more likely to petition government with grievances and
are more conservative than the general populace furthering this inequity giving a distinct set of
policy preferences among legislators and the executive 108 . Implicit with this line of thought is
that campaign finance reform should be geared toward either reducing this distortion by reducing
the voice of wealthier donors or by increasing the voice or positions (through participation) of
those who are not as represented in the current system of campaign finance. Clyde Wilcox
presented the idea that increasing the donor pool would possibly further reduce this inherent
distortion but in his analysis of the post 1970’s reform (which attempted to reduce this distortion)
this is not necessarily the case as he found that by 1988 this distortion towards wealthier
individuals was still significantly present 109 . Another possible implication in this inherent
participatory distortion is to effectively reduce or totally eliminate soft money in the campaign
finance system. However, Wilcox also makes the point that current knowledge and literature do
not necessarily show what donors get for their money 110 . However, it is often assumed that
giving monetary donations to political campaigns often results in greater access to the political
process but the dilemma here is whether or not donors receive what they want after they donate.
As was briefly pointed out in the previous paragraphs, one argument for campaign
finance reform is to reduce distortion and inequities within the system. One manner to reduce
this inequity or distortion would be to reduce the financial barriers for running a campaign as this
would effectively allow for potential greater representation among the less economically
endowed. The U.S. Supreme Court in Bullock v Carter decided that the State of Texas violated
the 14th Amendment (equal protection) by attempting to impose high filing fees to run for a
public office 111 . In this sense, it is undemocratic because the barriers placed upon entry into a
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campaign discriminate against those that are not wealthy. There are those that argue that active
judicial intervention may be a necessary condition for the reduction in inequalities and
distortions in the campaign finance system because the congressional and executive branches are
unlikely to impose proper reforms to reduce these inequities 112 . Marlene Nicholson argues that
the current campaign finance system is inherently undemocratic because “multiple voting” and
“multiple representation” is detrimental in that those who contribute to campaigns have more of
a say in who wins elections, compared to those individuals who just vote and do not
contribute 113 . Also, those individuals who contribute to campaigns, in addition to multiple
voting, are more likely to have their particular interests represented than those individuals who
do not contribute to campaigns 114 .
Again, one argument for campaign finance reform is that certain political actors will
make use of their economic advantages to create political corruption and power. Daniel Ortiz
presents an interesting idea of a democratic paradox in that (taken the assumption mentioned in
the previous sentence) voters, in traditional democratic theory, are informed and therefore make
“careful and informed” decisions when voting and economic inequalities among candidates do
not necessarily determine the outcome 115 . The paradox, then, materializes when reformers of
campaign finance make reforms that “doubt” voters’ civic capabilities 116 . Of course, there is
much contention and debate on voter information and civic capabilities but the idea presented
here is that democratic theory assumes some level of information and civic capabilities but
reformers of campaign finance base the reforms upon a different premise. Reformers partially
base their reforms upon the protection of “liberal” democratic ideals in that if candidates had no
preventative barriers then they would essentially reduce the level of liberal democracy due to
inequities in political power. Campaign finance reformers inherently base their reforms upon the
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mistrust of voters to make “independent political judgments” and the reformers become antiegalitarian in nature because they denounce liberal democratic ideals of equality 117 . J. Skelly
Wright, for example, argues that proper reforms should “refocus political discourse on
substantive ideas” thereby improving political debate and discussion 118 .
Getting back to modern reforms Michael J. Malbin recently wrote a book in which he
examined some possible effects of the passage of the BCRA, explicit to the 2004 presidential
election. He predicted in the text that there may be a two-tiered system that may arise in the near
or long term future in which one tier would contain a non-public supported candidates and the
other tier would contain public supported candidates 119 . This is primarily because some
candidates may decide to opt out of public support for their campaign because of the stipulations
and conditions attached to the taking of public funds. Also, candidates may choose to opt out of
public support of campaign finance simply because their options in running their particular
campaign will be greater than if they decide to accept public funds. Malbin also found that there
are many uncertainties that can possible shape or alter campaign finance regulations after they
are passed into law and that a natural evolution may take place that can dramatically alter or
shape the consequences of campaign finance reform legislation 120 . Of course, Malbin wrote this
text before McConnell v. FEC but the court’s decision effectively kept the whole of the
legislation intact. However, the BCRA of 2002 will surely have an effect upon the campaign
finance system.
Surely, the BCRA will have an effect upon the national political party system in terms of
the ability to accomplish the various goals of the political parties. Arguably, one of the main
goals of national political parties is to win federal elections and to gain a majority within
Congress and to ultimately gain control of the executive branch. This is not to say that there are
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no other goals of national parties; instead it is just one of the main goals. Diana Dwyre and
Robin Kolodny examined this phenomenon and found that the national political parties must
ultimately change their behavior to accomplish this goal of winning federal elections as the
regulatory environment has changed thereby changing how the parties must raise and spend
monies in the pursuit of this goal 121 . In theory, the BCRA outlawed most provisions for the
creation and use of soft money funds in federal elections. However, the “Levin amendment” to
the BCRA essentially allowed for soft money funding of voter registration and get-out-the-vote
activities by state and local party apparatuses if these activities are in compliance with state and
locals campaign finance laws 122 . Again, this provision only applies if state or local laws allow
such activities within their jurisdiction and candidates for federal office or those currently in
federal office are not allowed to engage in these types of soft money fundraising for the purposes
described above.
Nevertheless, on of the main goals of the BCRA was to eliminate the use of soft money
by national political parties for the explicit use of issue advocacy campaigns. However, as Diana
Dwyre and Robin Kolodny conclude the amount of soft money will not significantly diminish in
size and it will become more difficult to track and regulate simply because of the formation of
third party groups who pursue issue advocacy campaigns that a distinctly separate from the
political party apparatuses 123 . In other words, soft money may shift from the political parties to
other groups. It may, however, be more difficult for these third party groups to raise significant
soft money funds when compared to the established political parties simply due to the fact the
national party apparatuses are excellent and very efficient at raising the funds from a variety of
sources. If the soft money is effectively transferred from the national political parties to un-
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established third party groups as predicted then the behavior of the national parties will surely
change as well.
As mentioned in Chapter one some scholars, such as Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela
Karlan, argue that campaign finance reform has a balloon effect or “hydraulic” effect. When the
government places pressure for reform on one area money is effectively “squeezed” or moved
into other areas thereby negating the original pressure 124 . Implicit in this line of thought is the
idea that laws and regulations essentially do not wholly determine the outcome of campaign
finance reform; instead laws may make a difference in the eventual outcome but the differences
are often unpredictable. In other words, laws and regulations do make a difference but the
consequences are often different than the original intent. Furthering this line of argument is the
idea put forth by Larry Bartels that resource allocation within presidential elections is partially
determined by organizational and strategic considerations 125 . Not everyone agrees with these
assumptions as Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss Manes wrote an article for the Columbia Law
Review in which they chastise the American campaign finance system and proposed many
“solutions” to reduce perceived corruption including dramatically strengthening campaign
finance reform in all areas of campaign finance 126 .
Many theoretical aspects of campaign finance primarily revolve around the established
theories regarding pressure and power in relation to interest groups and presidential elections.
Anthony Nownes examined the various organized interest groups and the influence or pressure
they place upon the American political system 127 . Also, David A. Strauss examined corruption
and equality in campaign finance in which the courts are primarily concerned with possible
perceived corruption and not issues that involve possible inequalities but campaign finance
reformers should primarily be concerned with inequality simply because if a reduction in
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inequality is produced then corruption will also be reduced 128 . Basically, campaign finance
reform does make a difference in the system, but attempts at reform do not necessarily
accomplish their original goals. Also, Strauss raises an interesting question about whether or not
it is actually worth the full attempts at campaign finance reform because the costs of doing so are
considerably greater than any possible progress towards the original goals of reducing corruption
and inequalities 129 .
Along the same lines, Bradley Smith makes the argument that the scholarship of
campaign finance reform is incorrect when it makes certain assumptions on the causes and
effects of perceived corruption 130 . Basically, the problem with campaign finance reform is not
necessarily the unintended consequences; instead reform often favors the political elite and
maintains the status quo by discouraging grassroots campaigns. Two assumptions made by
Smith are that reformers often presume that too much money is being spent in campaigns and
that elections that have less money spent during the campaign are somehow more democratic in
nature than elections that have more money spent during the campaign 131 . Another faulty
assumption made by reformers is that money inherently “buys” elections but this is not stating
that money is not needed to win elections as the evidence clearly shows that the more money that
is spent the more likely that a candidate will win that election: instead the assumption that money
buys elections is done so through a prism that it is negative and detrimental to society as a
whole 132 . Finally, reformers often assume that money somehow corrupts the legislative process
and that given all of these assumptions, an unregulated system will further discriminate in favor
of wealthy interests but Smith categorically denies that these assumptions are inherently flawed
based upon qualitative analysis 133 .

For example, the total amount of money spent in campaigns

may seem impressive and it often solidifies this argument but when one takes into account the
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whole situation the relative amount spent is miniscule as Americans spend considerable more
amounts of money on other activities when compared to expenditures in campaigns 134 .
According to Smith reformers should examine these four misconceptions to properly address
campaign finance reform in a manner that will do more good than bad.
Also, Susan B. King and Robert L. Peabody introduced another important concept of
campaign finance reform 135 . Legislators and the president are assumed to seek reelection and
campaign finance regulations are often in conflict with this goal 136 . Paradoxically, it is
presumed to be against their best interest to press for the furthering of campaign finance
regulations and reforms. King and Peabody propose that one of the reasons why campaign
finance reform has largely failed (assuming that it has failed) is because of this conflict of
interest 137 . Also, it can be very difficult to distinguish or differentiate between “proper” and
“improper” campaign financial activities. Another reason given by King and Peabody as to why
campaign finance reforms have failed is because the reforms are often created and implemented
after scandals that swayed public opinion, such as during the early 1970’s and perhaps if
legislators could create reforms without the pressure of scandals then they possibly could create
meaningful reforms 138 .
Several classics in political science can also help to explain the phenomenon of
presidential campaign finance. First, Robert Dahl wrote a book in 1961, “Who Governs” that
helps to explain my thesis from a pluralist viewpoint because of the many varying interests
within the American political system and inherent perceived corruption that is possible under
such a system 139 . Additionally, groups of citizens (according to Dahl’s typology) are fully free
to have an influence upon the various political forces within a competitive party system,
including the American two-party system, and the political forces must listen to outside “forces”
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that are well beyond the scope of the “elite” 140 . Put in another way, the American society is
composed of many different elites or elite groups that are compromise or are in contention with
each other but the many elite groups exist within society. Also, this is a radical departure from
C. Wright Mills idea that society is comprised of unitary or narrowly defined power elite 141 .
In a more comprehensive theory, Mancur Olson developed a theory of groups that gives
an alternative notion such as follows: the number of similar interests that individuals may have
will not necessarily result in organized interests because of the cost, the free rider problem, and
the political efficacy problem 142 . Surely, the idea of selective benefits will be part of this
phenomenon. E.E. Schattschneider developed a realist viewpoint on interest groups in America
(“The Semisovereign People”) in that some “pressure groups” have the tendency to have greater
levels of influence upon the American system. Specifically, the pressure system that he describes
has an “upper class” or business bias 143 . Hyper-pluralism, such as the theory given by Theodore
Lowi, concludes that the varying interests are not necessarily beneficial to the American political
system as given by pluralism; instead they can be harmful because some organized interests may
have better access and influence upon the American system than other organized interests
thereby creating an inequity within the system 144 . Finally, Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert
Shapiro (“Politicians Don’t Pander, Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic
Responsiveness”) came to the conclusion that politicians (including contemporary presidents)
don’t necessarily respond to whims in public opinion; instead they, during times of no elections,
respond to their particular philosophical preferences and to the wishes of their contributors, party
activists, and friendly interest groups 145 .
Given the expansive scope of literature on the subject of campaign finance this thesis will
primarily focus upon the basic tenets of pluralism within the American society. The various
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interests within the American society all compete for support and loyalty among individuals and
groups for the eventual conclusion to conflict. However, it is also clear that some interests, as
described by Theodore Lowi and E.E. Schattschneider, within society have unequal access and
influence to the political and legislative system such as an upper class bias or that some interests
seemingly have greater access and influence to the system thereby creating great levels of
inequity and this inequity may not necessarily be healthy for the American pluralist system 146 .
Attempts at campaign finance reform, especially at the federal level to include both the
congressional and presidential candidates and incumbents, can be an attempt to reduce the
supposed inequity but many reforms to reduce this appearance of an inequity clearly have not
worked in the past and the analysis of this thesis will show that that scholars and politicians need
to take this phenomena when developing public policies and when completing empirical
analysis’s.
One of the assumptions made in the vast amounts of literature that was given previously
in this chapter is that the pluralist conception that society is effectively ruled by many competing
interests clearly hints that money in politics especially at the presidential level may not
necessarily be such a negative concept as long as there are reasonable checks and balances
within the campaign finance system. The current system does contain many checks and balances
but clear loopholes do exist. As stated previously in this chapter, Bradley Smith, makes a clear
statement that scholars of campaign finance reform may be incorrect when they automatically
assume that money in campaigns essentially “buys” elections and that the levels of money within
campaigns is automatically overbearing and needs to be reduced 147 . Elections can be an
expensive undertaking and pluralist theory then suggests that the many competing interests
within society are being partially satisfied with their contributions to the campaign finance
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system. In other words, if the pluralist or neo-pluralism concept is correct then simply abolishing
any money within the campaign finance system will not reduce the amount of outside influences
upon candidates and their subsequent campaigns. This needs to be taken into account when
examining the campaign finance system. Also, the suggestion that individuals and groups (to
include political parties) somehow influence campaigns, elections, and legislation then suggests
that the current system is un-democratic in nature simply because the minority rules. Again,
basic democratic tenets, including Dahl’s description of democracy mentioned in the previous
chapter, states that the majority should rule at least in conception. But this does not suggest
complete participation as majoritorian rule would suggest; instead it suggests that while
participation is minimal when compared to other countries the majority still rules.

-
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH STRATEGY
As stated before, one of the underlying themes in American politics is that the addition of
campaign finance laws or regulations at the presidential election level will have a negative
relationship with the amount of money in campaigns and the levels of regulation. In other words,
as regulation goes up the amount of money and influence will decrease, at least in theory.
However, with the recent 2004 presidential election this concept has surely been shown to be
problematic, at least at the outset. In other words, more campaign finance regulations at the
presidential level may not necessarily result in lower levels of corruption or for the reduction in
money in presidential politics.
There are many aspects or directions that this thesis can take when the analysis is
completed. For example, one could focus upon third party interest groups, such as MoveOn.org
or Swiftboat Veterans, and how campaign finance laws have an effect upon them. However, this
thesis will not focus upon third party groups because the amount of analysis would be prohibitive
and would not help to explain the original hypothesis. Instead, third party groups will be briefly
included in the analysis in that money moved away from more traditional venues (like the
political parties-soft money-or directly through the individual campaigns) and into the less
traditional groups as a direct result of the type of campaign finance laws that were implemented.
Additionally, one could focus upon specific kinds of campaigns (such as media driven vs. grass
roots) and how campaign finance laws have an effect upon them. This thesis will focus upon the
inherent failure of federal campaign finance laws on limiting the amount of money in
presidential campaigns.
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Also, this analysis will not determine whether or not corruption or perceived corruption is
actually present within the current presidential nomination system as it would be very
problematic to determine whether or not corruption is present. For example, it would be very
difficult to show that the president made a particular decision based purely upon the fact that he
received campaign contributions from a particular cause. That entity may contribute to a
particular campaign simply due to the fact that the presidential candidate already supports (or
will be likely to support) their particular cause. On the other side of the spectrum is the idea
corruption does indeed exist but that analysis will be made and is well beyond the scope of this
thesis. Also, the notion that money buys access is very plausible and the original hypothesis
assumes that this occurs.
Additionally, research on this topic will allow future researchers to understand that the
implementation of campaign finance laws at the presidential level will not necessarily result in
the intended consequences of the campaign finance reform. Instead, unintended consequences
may result in these attempts at reform. Policy makers and scholars need to examine the types of
campaign reform to determine which types will be most feasible. Future applications of this
topic can potentially be expanded to include research on the various congressional campaign
finance laws. However, the scope of this project will be to focus on the presidential level. The
research should show that further attempts at campaign finance reform at the presidential level
will not necessarily reduce the amount of money in the elections.
As stated in an earlier chapter, the independent variable will be defined as campaign
finance laws and the dependent variable will be defined purely as money in presidential
campaigns. Clearly, there may be many intervening variables that can attribute to changes to the
additional campaign contributions. In other words, are the increases in campaign finance
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contributions (money) directly attributed to changes or increases in campaign finance regulation
or can this phenomena be attributed to something else. Again, some possible intervening
variables are listed as follows: inflation (a thousand dollars is not worth as much as it used to be),
population growth (if more people are in the general population then the amount of money in a
campaign may also increase), the level of marginal elections (a campaign may be more likely to
spend more money in a close election than an election that essentially is blowout like the 1988
Presidential election in which President H.W. Bush easily defeated Michael Dukakis), and the
condition of the economy (individuals, corporations, and the various other interest groups may
be more willing to contribute more money to campaigns either directly through hard or soft
money or indirectly through third party groups if the economy is relatively in a good condition).
These possible intervening factors will be examined in Chapter four primarily by taking
each individual factor and separating it thereby allowing for individual factor analysis. The
population increase factor, for example, may account for the rapid rise in presidential campaign
finance expenditures and receipts. The percentage increase in population must be compared to
the percentage increase in campaign expenditures and receipts as if the original hypothesis is
correct then the population increase should not fully account for the rise in campaign spending.
In other words, population increases should create higher levels in campaign finance but this
increase should not significantly exceed the population growth rate. Inflation is another example
of how intervening factors may influence the amount of money in presidential elections. One
would expect that as inflation increases so should the amount or levels of money within
presidential campaigns would also increase. Additionally, an examination will occur with all of
these variables together to eliminate the possibility of an alternative hypothesis and to reject the
null hypothesis. For example, these intervening variables must be aggregated to eliminate the
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possibility that they could account for the rapid rise in campaign finance expenditures and
receipts in presidential elections. Again, these variables will be examined individually and in
combination in a multifactor analysis.
Primary data for this thesis will come from the FEC. The FEC regularly publishes data
files for this type of analysis. Reliable data from other sources, however, will be used and will
be properly annotated at the proper time. I shall begin the analysis with a brief examination and
interpretation of presidential primary campaign contributions and expenditures primarily because
the data clearly shows that despite attempts at campaign finance reforms the necessity to raise
campaign contributions early in the presidential nomination system is increasing. Outside of a
drastic overhaul of the whole presidential nomination system that data shows that further
attempts at presidential campaign finance regulations should not reduce the necessity for
campaign funds. In other words, the necessity for campaign funds will be present regardless of
campaign finance regulations. The data for the presidential primary nomination system also
comes from the FEC and is presented early in Chapter Four. Again, the purpose for beginning
the analysis with presidential primaries is because this analysis gives further empirical evidence
as to the validity of my original hypothesis that money does not cease to flow into campaigns
after campaign finance reforms are enacted.
Also, it is not possible to isolate individual reforms and compare the supposed effects of
the reform. This is partially because one cannot go back into time and effectively eliminate a
particular reform to see the consequences of not implementing that reform. Once a reform is in
place it may not be possible to determine what the effects would have been if the reform were
not created and placed into service. However, one can examine the effects of reforms that were
created and placed into service. A large percentage of the rapid increase in campaign finance
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expenditures may be attributed to inflation, population growth, costs in media and advertising,
and other increases associated grassroots campaigns. However, in general terms, inflation can
account for approximately 50% of the increases in expenditures (see figure 4.6 in the next
chapter).
The notion that the results of campaign finance reforms can be quantified is problematic.
However, one possible test, according to Jerrold E. Schneider, is to examine whether or not the
newly implemented reforms reduce corruption 148 . According to this logic corruption may be
defined as the “creation of political debts” usually from campaign contributions 149 . This
suggests that large contributions may have an influencing factor on political candidates.
However, if quantification is completed of campaign contributions then an overall analysis may
be completed that may either suggest that perceived corruption is either increasing or decreasing.
Again, there are many problems with this definition of political corruption as the notion has
many attachments that cannot be quantified or qualitatively defined in any significant manner.
However, many arguments rely upon the fact that campaign contributions at the presidential
level has risen significantly in recent years and this is emblematic of perceived greater levels of
corruption. The analysis given in the following chapter will examine various factors, mentioned
in the previous pages, to determine how significant this corruption may be when assuming this
definition. The analysis will take each variable, such as CPI inflation, and determine what the
impact is upon the rising levels of campaign expenditures and receipts. Again, this assumes that
corruption is partially a result of greater amounts contributions and I do not necessarily prescribe
to such a notion of corruption. It is being used as one manner for quantification.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

Clearly BCRA and other campaign finance regulations at the presidential level did not
reduce the amount of money in the presidential nomination system. In fact the necessity to raise
funds has increased dramatically in recent years for the primary campaign. According to the
FEC the Clinton campaign (for the 1996 presidential campaign) totaled about $42.5 million
dollars in primary campaign receipts while the Dole campaign totaled about $44.9 million in
receipts 150 . This is in stark contrast to 2004 presidential primary in which the Bush campaign
had around $269.6 million in receipts while the Kerry campaign had $234.6 million in receipts
for the primary campaign 151 . Table 4.1 clearly shows that presidential campaign receipts
doubled and even tripled between the years of 1996 and the 2004 presidential primary. The
interesting finding in table 4.1 is that the all other category remained about the same in the years
of 1996 and 2004 with a spike in 2000.

Table 4.1 Presidential Campaign Receipts (in millions of dollars)
Primary Campaigns________________________________________________________
2004

2000

1996

Bush

$269.6

Bush

$95.5

Clinton

$42.5

Kerry

$234.6

Gore

$48.1

Dole

$44.9

All Others

$169.7

All Others

$208.0

All Others

$160.9

In Millions of Dollars. Source: FEC http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/pres_cf/pres_cf.shtml.
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This may be attributed to whether or not an incumbent president ran in that particular primary
election cycle. However, the data presented in table 4.1 clearly shows an inherent need to raise
funds early in the presidential nomination system simply because the ability to do so may result
in greater electoral success. In other words, if a candidate does not raise enough funds then their
ability to succeed may diminish and that this necessity for funding may help to explain why
campaign contributions and expenditures continue to rise in spite of the recent additions to
campaign finance regulations.
Surprisingly, the relative amount of government matching funds in the primary election
cycle has not dramatically increased, at least at the same level of the overall campaign finance.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates this phenomenon in that between the presidential election of 1976 and
the election of 2004 the amount of matching funds went from about $25 million to about $28
million. Of course, the years in between show a lot of variation that can be attributed to a
number of factors; however once the variation is taken into account the amount only increased
Primary Matching Funds
$80,000,000
$70,000,000
$60,000,000
$50,000,000

Primary Matching
Funds

$40,000,000
$30,000,000
$20,000,000
$10,000,000
2004

1997

1990

1983

1976

$0

Source: FEC Press Release, http://www.fec.gov/press/press2005/20050203pressum/fundhistory.xls

Figure 4.1: Matching Funds in Primary Campaign
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modestly thereby partially indicating that despite the greater need for campaign funds the desire
for government matching funds did not increase in any significant terms. BCRA may have had
an effect upon the desire for matching campaign funds in the primary election cycle but the need
still remains at a minimal level. Remember, one of the reasons for government matching funds
was to help regulate the campaign finance system because those campaigns that accept matching
funds have certain criteria and conditions that must be met. The Bush campaign in 2004 stated
that they were reluctant to accept matching funds in the primary due the conditions that must be
met.
However, the demand and need for matching funds in the general election cycle has
increased significantly. In figure 4.2, below, the relationship of the amount of matching funds
and the necessity is clear. Between the election cycles of 1976 and 2004 the amount of money
used in matching funds has tripled, albeit it has recently (in recent years) leveled to a seemingly
status quo level. The satiable appetite for funding has created a great demand for matching funds,

Dollar Amount in Millions

Matching Funds for General Election
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Source: FEC, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/other_disclosure.shtml

Figure 4.2: Matching Funds in General Election
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2000

2005

2010

particularly among third party and smaller candidates. Again, Figure 4.2 clearly shows that the
need is great for campaign finance funding and this may suggest that one of the reasons for the
demand for campaign finance funding is that if one particular candidate does not adequately
reach a certain level then that candidate may not be able to fully compete at a sustainable level.
Although the particular amount of matching funds in the 2004 general presidential election cycle
may seem like a lot, around $149 million, in the overall perspective the amount is minimal when
compared to other levels of measurement. For example, if all of the money spent in the 2004
presidential election (around $1billion if both the primary and general elections are included and
this figure includes all known private donations and expenditures) were compared to other forms
of government spending then the amount may seem like a small number when taken from this
perspective 152 .
General Election
Now that the primary campaign has been examined the general election shows a dramatic
departure in the stability in the growth rate of campaign expenditures for presidential elections.
Figure 4.3 clearly shows that the growth rate in campaign expenditures has increased
dramatically since 1976. This phenomenon may be attributed to a number of factors such as
inflation, general campaign costs, the steep rise in media costs, and the need to shift the
campaign resources to other areas. The 1976 presidential election only required about $66.9
million dollars in campaign expenditures while the 2004 election required about $717.9 million
dollars according to Figure 4.3. Clearly the necessity to raise and use campaign funds has
increased dramatically in the past 30 years thereby requiring a greater need for campaign
fundraising. Also, figure 4.3 clearly shows that a sudden and dramatic shift in the increase in
campaign expenditures occurred in the 1990’s and period between 1976 and mid 1990’s saw
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increases in campaign expenditures that could be partially explained as due to inflationary
causes. Furthermore, according to figure 4.3 the total amount in presidential campaign
expenditures just about doubled from the 2000 election to the recent 2004 election while the
period between 1976 and 1980 only saw a moderate increase in the dollar amount of campaign
expenditures. This may suggest that the sudden and dramatic rise in the necessity for campaign
expenditures is only a recent phenomenon that may be attributed to electoral competitiveness
among the different candidates.
It is important to repeat that this dramatic increase in the necessity to raise and spend
campaign expenditures does not necessarily mean that political corruption is also increasing as
given by some pro-reformers of the campaign finance system. The resource allocation and
makeup of presidential campaigns may have shifted thereby creating the need for a greater
necessity to raise and spend campaign funds. As stated before in an earlier chapter, one cannot
properly conceptualize and quantify political corruption as it can be difficult to measure and
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Figure 4.3: Presidential Campaign Expenditures
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identify. Obviously, research can only properly identify those corruption cases that are
unequivocally identifiable and this usually only occurs after a political figurehead has been
indicted. In other words, it can be difficult to properly ascertain whether or not a politician or
political figurehead influenced or changed the political and legislative process through the direct
contributions of campaign funds. Money may buy access to the president or members of
Congress but this access does not necessarily mean that corruption is identifiably present 153 .
Nevertheless, it is clearly obvious that the need to raise and spend campaign funds is a dominant
feature of the current presidential nomination system.
Figure 4.4 is another indication of the recent trend in presidential campaign finance
expenditures and receipts. As should be expected, figure 4.4 clearly shows a positive
relationship with campaign expenditures and campaign receipts. In other words, as campaign
receipts increase the likelihood that campaign expenditures will increase also improves. A
surprising finding, according to figure 4.4, is that most of the campaigns did not spend all of their
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Figure 4.4: Expenditures and Receipts in Presidential Campaigns from 1976 to 2004.
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possible campaign funds. Obviously, a particular campaign cannot spend all of its funds but the
difference between campaign receipts and the campaign expenditures is dramatic. Much of the
money continues to be unused or is transferred to PAC’s or to other party apparatus’s and to
legal obligations. Nevertheless, the correlation is striking in that the apparent need to spend funds
has created a demand for drastic fundraising.
Additionally, figure 4.4 might suggest that the law of diminishing returns is present
within recent elections. Basically, a candidate that spends $200 million on a candidate will
receive an X amount votes but if this same candidate spends an additional $200 million the
candidate will most likely receive more votes than if that candidate only spent $200 million but
the number of new voters has decreased dramatically when comparing a cost analysis of the unit
cost per voter. In other words, the candidate may get one vote per $1,000 dollars that he/she
spends on the first $200 million but the cost per vote might increase after the $200 million. As
Bradley Smith stated, this diminishing return might suggest that voters may not elect a candidate
who spends a massive amount of campaign funds if the voters do not like the message or the
retrospective record of that candidate 154 .
One of the main arguments for BCRA is that the implementation of the legislation would
reduce the influence of soft money and other forms of money within presidential elections.
However, it is clear that the level of contributions by wealthy individuals and groups has
dramatically increased and by this measure BCRA might be considered to be a failure. In other
words, as the level of campaign finance regulations increases the levels of available campaign
funds (either through public or private funding) does not decrease. Figure 4.4 clearly shows that
the dramatic increase from 2000 to 2004 (from $343.1 million to $717.9 million) in campaign
expenditures resulted in a failure of the BCRA to reduce influence of soft money in campaigns.
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Money that was not accounted for increased from 2000 to 2004 partially because the rise media
costs, population increases, and rise in influence by 527C’s.
Variables
The rapid rise in the levels of campaign finance receipts and expenditures at the
presidential level since the 1970’s may be attributed to increases in the population. This school
of thought may be that it makes sense that as population increases so will the contributions and
expenditures to political campaigns but is this idea actually representative of the actual
environment? According to the U.S. Census bureau the population increase from 1990 to 2000
was approximately 13.2% 155 . According to figures 4.3 and 4.4 the increase in campaign finance
expenditures during presidential elections was approximately 62% from the 1988 presidential
election to the 2000 election. Furthermore, the data also shows that the population increase since
1969 to 2000 was approximately 38% as the population in 1969 was approximately 203 million
while the population in 2000 was approximately 281 million 156 . With all other factors and

Table 4.2 Comparison of change in population increases and campaign expenditure increases
from 1976 to 2000.
Year

Population __________

Campaign Expenditure___________

1976

212 Million*

$66.9 Million

2000

281 Million

$343.1 Million

Percentage of Change

+32.5%

+412.86%_____________________

Source: FEC http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/pres_cf/pres_cf.shtml, 1976 Statistical Abstract of the United States
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1970-01.pdf, 2000 Census. Also, the population numbers have
been rounded to create cohesion among the numbers.

*Estimated population in 1976 based upon actual census taken in 1970 and 1980,
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variables being equal one might expect that increases in campaign finance should increase
approximately this percentage in roughly the same period of time. With these data the conclusion
must be made that the rapid increase in campaign expenditures surely cannot be fully attributed
to increases in the overall population. In other words, the increase in population cannot explain
the rapid rise in campaign finance expenditures and receipts in presidential campaigns from the
year 1976 until the year 2000.
Table 4.2 clearly shows that the dramatic increases in campaign expenditures from 1976
until 2000 cannot be attributed to population increases whenever the variable is taken alone
without the influence of other variables such as inflation. The positive percentage in change in
the general population, according to table 4.2, is approximately 13.2% while the positive
percentage changes in campaign expenditures increased by approximately 412%. This may
suggest that the dramatic increase in campaign expenditures at the presidential level may be
attributed to some other factor or variable. The amount spent per capita in 1976 is also in stark
contrast to the amount spent per capita in 2000 thereby suggesting that amount of money spent
was heavily diluted when compared to the 1976 presidential election cycle. In other words,

Table 4.3 Change in voters minds about whom they would vote for in the 2004 presidential
election.
_________________

_____Bush Voters

Thought that they would vote
For someone else
Never thought that they would vote
For someone else.

Kerry Voters____Other Voters___________

16%

15%

15%

84%

85%

84%

Source: 2004 NAES, press release January 7, 2005. “Few American Voters Ever Changed Their Minds, National
Annenberg Survey Shows”.< http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes/2004_03_mindset-bush-kerrysupporters_%2001-05_pr.pdf>.
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spending in presidential campaigns may be partially attributed to the notion that more money
must be raised and spent throughout the campaign to attain the same level of influence upon
individual voters. It may have not been necessary to spend such levels of monies in 1976 simply
because the campaigns were either educating the voter in a more efficient manner or because the
ability to reach the voters was more cost effective. Additionally, the sudden rise in media costs
may be a factor as to why this occurred.
According to the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) of 2004, the percentage
of Americans (voters) who changed their minds was dramatically lower in the 2004 presidential
election when compared to previous elections 157 . Table 4.3 may suggest that it is becoming
increasingly difficult to educate voters to sway their opinions throughout an election cycle. The
difficulty in the 2004 presidential election to sway or change the opinions of voters, particularly
median voters, may force or persuade the particular presidential campaigns to increase their
campaign expenditures; thereby inherently increasing their need to increase their campaign
receipts. Again, this finding may not be statistically significant when analyzing the dramatic
increase in campaign expenditures and receipts but it does provide an alternative explanation as
to one possible reason for the sudden rise in campaign expenditures and receipts from 1976 to
2004.
An interesting development occurs when one examines whether or not inflation could
account for some of the dramatic rise in campaign finance expenditures and receipts. At the
outset, the examination of inflationary rates since 1976 shows that the $66.9 million spent during
the presidential election cycle in 1976 would account for approximately $223.6 million in 2004
dollars and some estimates find that the 1976 value would account for approximately $229
million 158 . As stated before, the 2004 presidential election cycle had approximately $717.9
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million dollars spent during the campaigns and this expenditure is well above the $223 million
inflationary number (See figure 4.5). This partially suggests, then, that inflation alone cannot
account for the dramatic rise in campaign finance expenditures since 1976. However, inflation
increases since 1976 do account for a large percentage of the increases thereby reducing the
effectiveness of the pro-campaign finance reform groups as part of their argument clearly
revolves around the notion that the dramatic increases in campaign finance expenditures
inherently result in corruption. This is especially true when one takes into account both inflation
and population increases since 1976 as both of these variables can account for about one fourth
of the increases in campaign expenditures.
Figure 4.5 compares the expenditures and inflation from 1976 until 2004. The first
column of expenditures shows the actual presidential campaign expenditures in 1976 and 2004
while the inflation column shows the actual campaign expenditure in 1976 while the second bar
in the inflation column shows where campaign expenditures would be if only inflation accounted
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Figure 4. 5: Comparison of campaign expenditures and inflation between 1976 and 2004.
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for increases in expenditures. The pictorial representation in figure 4.5 clearly shows a dramatic
difference between the actual campaign expenditure in 1976 and in 2004 as the difference clearly
shows that inflation alone cannot account for dramatic rise in campaign expenditures. Also, the
pictorial representation in figure 4.5 clearly shows that the various campaign finance laws
implemented since the early 1970’s have not worked in terms of keeping the growth rate of
campaign finance expenditures in control. In other words, attempts at campaign finance
regulations, including the recent BCRA, have not worked when framing the issue in terms of
increases in expenditures and receipts. Clearly some other variable, other than inflation, must
account for the recent and rapid growth in campaign finances. However, it is also plausible that a
combination of variables (such as inflation, population increases, and increases in media costs)

Table 4.4 Marginality of Presidential Elections since 1976 by percentage of popular vote count
Year

Winner Percentage

Loser Percentage

Other Percentage

______

1976

50.1% (Carter)

48% (Ford)

1.9%

1980

50.7% (Reagan)

41% (Carter)

8.3%

1984

58.8% (Reagan)

40.6% (Mondale)

0.6%

1988

53.4% (Bush 41)

45.6% (Dukakis)

1.0%

1992

43.3% (Clinton)

37.4% (Bush 41)

18.9% (Perot)

1996

49.2% (Clinton)

40.7% (Dole)

10.1%

2000

47.9% (Bush 43)*

48.38% (Gore)*

3.7%

2004

50.7% (Bush)*

48.27% (Kerry)*

1%*____________________

Source: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoralcollege/index.html>. Also see reference on page 95 159 .
*Approximate percentages as actual percentages are relatively close.
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can account for this rapid increase.
Table 4.4 clearly shows that volatility in presidential elections since 1976 in terms of the
victory margins. In 1976 approximately a 2% gap occurred between the winner and the loser of
that election while a 2.4% gap occurred in the 2004 election. In relative terms these gaps are not
significant in that the elections were close. In between 1976 and 2004 a wide range of gaps
occurred with the 2000 election showing less than a 1% gap and the 1984 election showing about
an 18.2% gap. One might expect that the marginal level of a presidential election
might have an effect upon the spending in campaigns. If this were true then the amount of
spending throughout the campaign of 2004 would have subsided a bit when compared to the
2000 election because the salience of the election would have been higher thereby possibly
garnering more campaign receipts (after taking into account inflation and population growth).
This, however, assumes that closer elections have higher levels of salience than elections that
have wider gaps in the marginal levels. The amount spent during the 2000 election, according to
figure 4.3, was approximately $343.1 million while the amount spent in the 2004 election was
approximately $717.9 million. Clearly, the marginal level of an election does not have a
significant effect upon the amount spent during a campaign as given by the elections from 1976
to 2004. Some other factor must account for the rapid rise in campaign expenditures and
receipts.
Table 4.5 is another comparison of the marginality of elections and the relationship with
campaign contributions. The marginal gap, the difference between the winner and the dominant
loser in presidential elections since 1976, contains a lot of variability in that the changes from
one election to another election are dramatic and may be both positive and negative. However,
except for one outlying case in the 1988 election, campaign expenditures between 1976 and 2004
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were very consistent in that they were continually positive (see figure 4.3). In other words,
except for 1988, each election had an increase in campaign expenditures while the marginal gap
was relatively volatile in that the variance from one election to another was wide. This finding
may suggest that the marginal level of an election may not have a significant impact upon the
level of campaign expenditures. As campaign expenditures increase the likelihood that marginal
levels will either increase or decrease cannot be determined thereby resulting in no significant
relationship between the two variables. This is partially because that from one election to
another the likelihood that the marginal level may increase or decrease and campaign
expenditures cannot take this into account. Clearly, the marginal level of presidential campaigns
can be excluded as a significant factor in the recent rapid rise in campaign expenditures and
receipts.

Table 4.5 Comparison of marginal gap in presidential elections and campaign expenditures
Year

Marginal Gap

Campaign Expenditure_________________

2004

2.4%

$717.9

2000

-.48%

$343.1

1996

8.5%

$239.9

1992

5.9%

$192.2

1988

7.8%

$210.7

1984

18.2%

$103.6

1980

9.7%

$92.3

1976

2.1%

$66.9_______________________________

Source: FEC <http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/other_disclosure.shtml>, and NARA
<http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/index.html>,
*Marginal Gap is the difference between the winner and dominant loser in the particular presidential election
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The unemployment figure is one indicator as to the overall general condition of the
economy. Perhaps, if the overall condition of the economy is relatively poor then campaign
receipts might be expected to be lower simply because fewer individuals may be willing to
donate to particular presidential campaigns. This might occur in both individuals and companies
or other institutions partially because if an institution is getting rid off workers then they may be
less likely to donate to campaigns because of presumed cash flow problems. If this hypothesis is
correct then one would expect that the unemployment rate would consistently decrease, except
for 1992 due to the recession and decreased campaign expenditures when compared to the

Table 4. 6 Comparison of unemployment and campaign expenditures and receipts from 19762004
Year

Unemployment rate

Campaign Expenditure_

Campaign Receipts

2004

5.5%

$717.9

$880.5

2000

4.0%

$343.1

$528.9

1996

5.4%

$239.9

$425.7

1992

7.5%

$192.2

$331.1

1988

5.5%

$210.7

$324.4

1984

7.5%

$103.6

$202

1980

7.1%

$92.3

$161.9

1976

7.7%

$66.9

$171______________

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Household Data Historical,
<ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.cpseea1.txt>, FEC
<http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/other_disclosure.shtml>.
*Unemployment data taken from Household Data Historical, Employment status of civilian noninstitutional
population 16 years and over, 1969 to date, Campaign expenditure and Campaign Receipts in Millions.
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1988 presidential election. At the outset this hypothesis is problematic for several reasons
mainly due data collection, unknown errors, and it does not take into account other factors such
as the particular salience of an election cycle.
Table 4.6 shows this relationship and it suggests that this particular hypothesis is not
valid with any degree of measure. The unemployment rate does not seem to have a significant
impact upon either campaign receipts or campaign expenditures. This partially suggests that
some other factor or variable must account for the rapid rise in campaign expenditures. The only
outlying case is between the election cycles of the 1988 and 1992 when the unemployment rate
shot up and a partial recession occurred 160 . However, the campaign receipts did increase
between 1998 and 1992, according to table 4.6, while campaign expenditures actually decreased
in the 1992. This finding that campaign receipts always increased from one election cycle to
another suggests that unemployment rates and the overall general condition of the economy may
not have a significant impact upon campaign receipts. Again, while campaign expenditures
increased slightly in 1992 from 1988, the likelihood of determining campaign receipts and
expenditures cannot be determined solely from the data presented in table 4.6. The
unemployment rate varied considerably from 4.0% in 2000 to 7.7% in 1976 while both campaign
expenditures and receipts contained only a small amount of variation. While the overall general
condition of the economy and the subsequent unemployment rates may have an impact upon the
choice for a presidential candidate by individual voters this variable (unemployment rate and
overall general condition of the economy) does not have a significant impact upon either
campaign receipts or campaign expenditures. Clearly, unemployment can be excluded as a
significant factor in the recent rapid increases in campaign expenditures and receipts.
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Cross Examination
It has become clear that the rapid rise in campaign expenditures cannot be explained by
taking each variable alone. The rapid growth rate in expenditures dwarfs any explanation when
examining one particular variable at a time. However, these variables when combined may help
to explain the original hypothesis. Campaign finance regulations are an attempt to regulate and
limit money within presidential campaigns according to supporters of reform. However, each
attempt at campaign finance regulation has not resulted in some of the intended consequences, as
both campaign expenditures and receipts have dramatically climbed; especially since the early to
mid-1970s when some of the most dramatic reforms were imposed and then FEC was created.
Again, the notion of whether or not reforms lead to less corruption is beyond the scope of this
thesis because the examination and conceptualization can be very difficult. The attempt here is
to examine whether or not the campaign finance regulations actually accomplish their intended
goal of reducing the relative
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of percentage increases in expenditures, population, and CPI inflation
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amount of money within presidential elections. Clearly, the hypothesis seems to be correct as
the amount of money in presidential elections has dramatically increased after the
implementation of the drastic reforms of the early to mid 1970s and after the implementation of
the BCRA of 2002. In theory, both of these reforms were attempts to further regulate both hard
and soft monies in federal elections. However, it is clear that at the presidential level monies
within the campaigns increased dramatically and attempts were made to bypass the BCRA
through third party groups.
Figure 4.6 displays the percentage increase in each category from 1980 to 2000.
Presidential campaign expenditures increased approximately 217.2% from 1980 to 2000 while
the population only increased approximately 24.2% in the same period. Clearly population
growth alone cannot account for the rapid rise in expenditures. However, as figure 4.6 displays,
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation increase from 1980 to 2000 was approximately
108.98%. This one statistic is significant because it alone can account for approximately 50% of
the growth rate in campaign expenditures. In other words, approximately half of the increases in
campaign expenditures can be explained purely to inflationary causes. The population increase
only has minimal impact upon the rise in campaign expenditures. Supporters of campaign
finance reform categorically state that reform is purely needed due to the rapid rise in
expenditures as this may be indicative of perceived corruption.
This finding that CPI inflationary index, see figure 4.6, can account for a large percentage
of the increases in campaign expenditures since 1976 might reduce the explanatory power of
those who favor more campaign finance regulations and reforms. Perhaps, the level of campaign
spending or expenditures may not be as immense as some argue. Also, these findings tend to
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negate the level of explanatory power for the argument that reforms made in recent years were
successful. One of the tests, as given in the previous chapter, for the success of a particular
reform is the determination of whether or not the reform reduced perceived corruption.
Corruption is defined as “creation of political debts” usually from campaign contributions 161 .
The findings in figure 4.6 suggest that political debts from campaign contributions may not be as
large as an influence upon corruption as some suggest partially because two variables alone, CPI
inflation and population growth, can account for over 50% of the increase in campaign
expenditures from 1980 to 2000. In other words, the seemingly rapid rise in campaign
expenditures may not necessarily be a produce of greater political debts through campaign
contributions simply because other factors such as the CPI inflationary index, population growth,
and the greater costs for media may all contribute to the rapid rise in contributions and
expenditures by presidential campaigns since the 1970’s.

Percentage Change from 2000 to 2004
120

Percentages

100
80
60
40
20
0
Expenditure

Population

CPI Inflation

Source: FEC, CPI Indexes and the U.S. Census Bureau.
Note: Percentage increase between 2000 and 2004. The population is estimated for the year 2004 by the U.S. Census
Bureau.

Figure 4.7: Percentage change from 2000 to 2004.
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A surprising finding develops when a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004 using
the variables expenditures, population increases, and increases in the CPI inflation. The finding
from figure 4.6 clearly shows that inflation had a significant impact upon the rapid growth rate in
campaign expenditures from 1980 to 2000. However, figure 4.7 clearly shows inflation was not
as significant factor between 2000 and 2004 as both inflation and population growths were kept
at minimal growth rate percentages. If the assumption is made and accepted that increases in
political debts through campaign contributions also raises perceived political corruption then the
findings of figure 4.7 clearly shows the one of the tests of the success rate of campaign reforms
results in a clear failure of BCRA. In other words, BCRA failed partially because campaign
expenditures increased 109% from 2000 to 2004 and the CPI inflationary index and the
population growth cannot account for the rapid increase. However, the period between 2000 and
2004 may turn out to be an outlying case when future analyses are completed many years from
now. It may turn out that this period is just abnormal and the variability within the percentages
may decrease over time.
Figure 4.7 may give supporters of reform greater explanatory power that perceived
corruption may be increasing due to the rapid rise in campaign expenditure. However, it also
suggests that BCRA did not accomplish reducing the influence of money in presidential elections
and those reforms since the 1970’s did not accomplish reducing the influence of money. Finally,
figures 4.6 and 4.7 may partially suggest that further attempts at meager reforms may not
necessarily result in reducing the influence of money in presidential elections. This also partially
suggests that tests for success in campaign finance reforms clearly shows that recent attempts at
reforms have failed and that basic attempts at reform will be doomed to similar fates.
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The Nixon campaign raised approximately $60 million for the 1972 presidential election
cycle and the total amount spent during the 1972 election cycle by both parties was not
significantly different than in the 1976 election 162 . Furthermore, FECA was not implemented
until 1974 and Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1) was not completed until 1976 and Congress
amended FECA several times during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 163 . In other words, the
variability of reform during the 1970’s was too great to draw any significant conclusions
between the election cycles of 1972 and 1976. Therefore the effects of the reforms in the 1970’s
should show in the election cycles of 1980 and possibly 1984.
Figure 4.8 clearly shows that campaign expenditures increased dramatically in the
election cycles following the implementation of reforms. The 1980 and 1984 cycles followed
FECA (including the number of amendments to the legislation from the 1970’s up to the 1984
election cycle) saw a percentage increase from the previous election of 37.9% in 1980 to 12.24%
in 1984, according to figure 4.8. Also, the election cycle of 2004 saw a percentage increase of
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of Expenditure Change after reform
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approximately 109.2% from the 2000 election cycle. Clearly BCRA, FECA, and Buckley v.
Valeo (424 U.S. 1) did not effectively reduce the levels or percentage increase in campaign
contributions and expenditures. In other words, as the number of reforms increased the amount
of money within elections as increased. Obviously, a positive relationship develops showing a
relationship between reform and the level of campaign funds. However, one must cautious as it
may be that reform may not be the leading cause of increases in expenditures. It does become
clear, however, that attempts at reform have not properly accomplished their intended goals if the
original goal was to reduce perceived corruption and to reduce money within presidential
campaigns. Essentially, a causal relationship between the independent variable (reform) and the
dependent variable (money within presidential campaigns) may not be evident albeit a
relationship does exist.
Conclusion
The data and findings within this chapter clearly show that a relationship between
reforms and the level of campaign finance expenditures exist but this relationship may not
necessarily be a causal relationship. As reforms increase, the level of campaign funds at the
presidential level also increases. This partially suggests that recent (since the early 1970’s)
attempts at campaign finance reform have not worked and supporters of reform need to look at
different solutions to decrease the amount of money in presidential elections. The implications
for public policy are great, as examinations into the presidential nomination system and the
general elections are needed to give scholars a better understanding of these attempted reforms.
This is especially true for the recent implementation of BCRA and dramatic increase in
campaign expenditures and receipts between the election cycles of 2000 and 2004. The CPI
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inflation and population increases do not explain or are not a significant factor in this rapid rise
in campaign expenditures and receipts. Therefore, it is clear that BCRA did not accomplish the
goal of limiting soft money within presidential campaigns.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
The finding of this thesis clearly shows that reforms of presidential campaign finance do
not necessarily result in their intended consequences. Reformers of presidential campaign
finance often base their arguments upon two main principles. The first principle is equality in
that some reforms attempt to reduce the inherent inequality between presidential candidates.
This premise assumes that a candidate’s ability to properly communicate with the voters may
contain inequalities in that one candidate may have an inherent advantage over another candidate
in the ability to advertise or pass information to voters. One test to the success or failure of
presidential campaign finance reform should be to examine this inequality and whether or not the
given reforms actually reduced the inequality among the candidates 164 . The main purpose of this
thesis is not to fully examine this hypothesis simply because of the connotative and denotative
meanings of inequality among presidential candidates. The second main principle of reform is
the level of perceived corruption in the presidential nomination system and subsequent
campaigns. This premise partially assumes that greater amounts of funds in presidential
campaign automatically results in greater levels of corruption. The purpose of this thesis is not
necessarily to examine corruption in presidential politics; instead the main purpose is to examine
whether or not campaign reforms actually accomplish what they were supposed to originally
accomplish. The overwhelming evidence supports the claim that reforms, at the presidential
level, may not have accomplished all of there original goals.
The first chapter briefly started to explain the short history of campaign finance reform in
the United States. Clearly, reforms often came after big political scandals at the federal level to
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contain both the president and members of Congress. It is also clear that campaign finance at the
federal level was not really needed in the infancy of the United States because communication
from campaigns to voters usually only required a minimal effort partially because the electorate
was largely homogeneous as male white landowners were typically the only people who voted.
Basically, the need for electoral resources was minimal; therefore the need to attain greater levels
of electoral resources was also kept to a minimum. Reform, then, would not be needed until the
need for greater electoral resources became great. The period around 1828 had greater levels of
population growth and some states reduced some of the barriers to vote, such as the abolishment
of the requirement to own property 165 . Bradley Smith found that the campaign of Martin Van
Buren added to the need for greater electoral resources partially because the campaign attempted
to achieve greater outreach and communication with the voters 166 . Population growth, reduction
of barriers to vote, and the election campaign of Marin Van Buren led to the need for greater
electoral resources and with the need for greater levels of campaign finance the insatiable
appetite for greater levels of campaign finance funding became apparent.
The Pendleton Act of 1883 was the first real attempt at reforming the campaign finance
system as it got rid of the “spoils” system and created the United States Civil Service
Commission (currently called the Office of Personnel Management) 167 . Before the
implementation of the Pendleton Act much of the funding for congressional campaign
committees came from obligatory donations from political patronage positions within the federal
bureaucracy. The need for electoral resources then became apparent and many reforms between
the Pendleton Act and BCRA did not effectively reduce the insatiable appetite for electoral
resources. In other words, the many attempts at reforming the campaign finance system at the
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federal level have not resulted in lower levels of inequality, corruption, and the need for greater
amounts of campaign finance funding.
The tumultuous time in the early 1970’s created situation that demanded further
campaign finance reform. The Watergate Scandal and the general political climate ultimately led
to the creation of the FEC and the subsequent decision by the Supreme Court in Buckley v Valeo
(424 U.S. 1) effectively created oversight to the presidential campaign finance system.
However, the extensive reforms in the 1970’s and the subsequent amendments did not effectively
reduce the insatiable appetite for campaign funds and the ultimate failure of many of the
campaign finance reforms have not adequately addressed the main issue of reducing the need or
desire for campaign funds. The failure of the 1970’s reforms eventually led to the
implementation of BCRA in 2002. It may be a bit early to properly determine the success or
failure of BCRA but it is obviously clear that the 2004 presidential race demanded record
amounts of campaign expenditures and receipts (see table 4.6). If one of the goals of BCRA is to
reduce the amount of money in presidential campaigns then it appears as though BCRA failed by
any significant degree of measurement.
It is clear that the general public favors campaign finance reform partially due to the
perceived nature of potential political corruption. However, the data contained within this thesis
clearly shows that corruption is not a dominant feature of the presidential campaign finance
system as a large percentage of the rapid rise in campaign contributions can be attributed to
inflation and population growth. Many of the campaign finance reforms were implemented
directly after major scandals, such as ABSCAM and Watergate, suggesting that rapid changes in
public sentiment may be a catalyst for changes in the campaign finance system at the federal
level. Potential reformers of the current political presidential campaign system typically argue
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that money within the scope of the American system influences the overall system thereby
potentially influencing the outcome. The general public generally holds a similar viewpoint in
their perception of the campaign finance system but simply reforming the overall general
campaign finance system will not necessarily reduce the interests that are contained within the
system 168 . Instead the interests that are contained within the system are simply moved from area
to another area within the same system.
Chapter one gave a brief historical overview of campaign finance reform at the federal
level and gave some basic theoretical explanations. It is clear that the United States is pluralistic
in nature (or hyper-pluralistic as given by Lowi) and socialization of conflict can help us to
explain why campaign finance reform at the federal level may not necessarily work. E.E.
Schattsneider explained this phenomenon of socialization of conflict because democratic
governments prosper from conflict because the socialization process expands the scope of the
conflict 169 . This theoretical assumption adds to the argument against presidential campaign
finance reform simply because the addition of presidential finance regulations will not
necessarily reduce the socialization of conflicts that are inherently contained within democratic
societies. In other words, greater regulation will not necessarily reduce socialized conflicts
within society because these conflicts will still permeate society in some form.
This line of thought supports the idea that American society contains many competing
interests was not properly addressed in recent campaign finance reforms. As explained in
chapter one, money within politics may contain characteristics that are hydraulic in nature
because it can be very difficult to simply get rid of political money and political resources 170 .
Additionally, money is similar to water because if someone cannot simply discard of water as it
has to go somewhere such as a river and simply damming a river only moves the water from one
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place to another. Also, campaign money is part of a broader environment in which scholars must
examine the overall environmental system to fully understand the implications of a change in the
overall presidential campaign system. Basically, if the whole political environment is not
carefully examined then simply adding more campaign finance reforms may not necessarily
result in fewer dollars in campaigns. The 2004 presidential election clearly showed that the
necessity for campaign funds has only increased after campaign finance reform and that the
numbers of competing interests within American society have not diminished since the
implementation of these reforms.
Chapter two briefly examined the various literatures in relation to presidential campaign
finance reform. The explanations given by scholars of campaign finance reform at the federal
level have widely varying opinions as to the possible consequences of reform and to the proper
answer to the dilemma of reducing corruption versus equality. Many call for a drastic overhaul
of the campaign finance system in which the necessity for campaign finance is drastically
reduced. However, these types of reforms (such as full public funding and the abolition of any
private funding by any group or interest) may not be palatable for the American system or to the
general public. Other types of reform call for weaker measures but it is abundantly clear from
the vast literature that weaker reforms do not necessarily result in less influence from the various
competing groups and interests within society. Democratic values and group affect towards the
idea of campaign finance can often determine whether or not reforms are implemented.
Justin Nelson concluded that the campaign finance system can be divided into two parts
with one side being the supply side and the other being the demand side 171 . Furthermore,
Nelson finds that reforms often focus upon the supply side while neglecting the demand side of
campaign finance and those reforms will not necessarily accomplish their goals until both sides
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of campaign finance are properly addressed 172 . This line of thought is similar to much of the
literature in that one of the dominant themes within the literature is that reforms are often only
focused upon one particular area while neglecting other areas of the campaign finance system.
Also, reforms will not necessarily work until all areas are examined. Of course, some frame it as
equality, freedom of speech, exogenous v endogenous, and organizational theories. The point
here is that most of the literature, despite how it is particularly framed, explains that campaign
finance reforms have often failed primarily due to the neglect of some areas within the campaign
finance system such as the exclusion of certain endogenous factors.
Chapter three primarily focused upon the research strategy in regards to the quantification
of campaign finance reforms efforts. These efforts were primarily framed upon the idea that one
of the ultimate goals of reformers is to reduce the external funding of presidential campaigns.
The variables of CPI inflation, population growth, marginality of elections, and unemployment
rates were all used as possible intervening variables that could potentially have an impact upon
the dependent variable. One of the main purposes for using these variables are to effectively
determine whether or not the rapid rise in campaign expenditures were a result of these variables
or were a result of some other factor. The data primarily came from the FEC and the U.S.
Bureau of Labor statistics. Also, these variables were used to eliminate alternative hypothesis
that might help to explain the rapid growth rate in both campaign funds and expenditures. The
data in chapter four clear suggests that while they can account for a significant portion of the
increase they cannot fully account for the rapid rise in expenditures and receipts.
One of the main driving forces of potential reform is the idea that to reduce potential
corruption reform must implemented to reduce the “creation of political debts” that are partially
created by large campaign contributions 173 . One possible method to quantify the success or
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failure of a particular campaign finance reform, according to Jerrold Schneider, is to examine
whether or not newly implemented reforms reduce corruption 174 . This idea assumes that large
contributions inherently create corruption primarily due to the political debts. The success or
failure of a particular reform is to determine the amounts of contributions (or expenditures as
expenditures are a direct result of contributions) in relation to previous election cycles before and
after the reforms. This is one of the main research strategies of this thesis in that an analysis of
elections after reforms can partially determine the effectiveness of the reforms.
Chapter four examined the various variables and the determination of campaign
contributions and expenditures. The analysis began by examining the presidential nomination
system in the primaries to examine the recent rapid growth rate in primary funding. Presumably
campaign finance reforms are geared toward both the primary and the general elections. The
analysis found that the necessity to raise and spend funds in the primary elections since 1976
have dramatically increased and this partially suggests that political debts are increasing thereby
negating the reforms. Reforms have not accomplished the goals of reducing political debts in the
primary election system.
Matching funds were also briefly examined in both the primary and general elections.
Surprisingly, the analysis showed extreme variability in matching funds in the primary election
cycles since 1976. Presumably, matching funds should increase dramatically if reforms
accomplish the goal of reducing political debts. However, figure 4.1 clearly shows this
variability and may suggest that political campaigns, especially the dominant candidates, require
greater amounts of private funding. Also, figure 4.2 showed a positive linear relationship since
1972 in matching funds in the general election cycles. This may suggest that the necessity for
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matching funds in general election cycles are not a dominant feature of the overall campaign
finance system.
After the brief examination of the primary election cycles and the subsequent matching
funds the analysis began to examine the variables mentioned above. After each particular
variable was examined individually the analysis showed that only inflation and population
growth had any significant impact upon the rapid rise in campaign expenditures and receipts
since 1976. However, inflation and the population growth variables cannot fully account for the
rapid rise in campaign expenditures and receipts. This may suggest that the need for campaign
funds in both the primary and general elections has become a greater necessity than before
BCRA and the intensive reforms of the 1970s. It becomes clear that political debts have also
rapidly increased since 1976 thereby showing that campaign finance reforms at the presidential
level have largely failed and additional modest reforms will not decrease the need for campaign
funds.
The future for reformers seems to be pessimistic as reforms do not seem to work as
intended. However, the goal of greater scrutiny of campaigns and the contributors has been one
area of success in reforms, albeit more scrutiny is probably justified. The finding of this thesis
does not suggest that all reforms are doomed to failure. If full equal public funding was
implemented and all private funding was eliminated then the ideal of equality among the
different candidates may be realized. However, this option is highly unlikely as Buckley v Valeo
(424 U.S. 1) states that public funding is okay as long as it is voluntary. The likelihood that
candidates would use full public funding voluntarily is highly unlikely as they may be able to
raise more funds privately. Also, fully matching funding may be unpalatable to the American
public as it surely would cost the taxpayers a lot of money. Another possible option is to
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generate more public access programs (in terms of communication programs) for candidates to
reduce the need for greater campaign funding. However, this option is also unlikely as it may be
very difficult, legally, to force campaigns to use public access programs and to abandon the
traditional method of directly paying for advertising and communications.
There are many other suggestions at potential reforms for the future but most of these
suggestions have many problems. Also, many of the reforms revolve around the idea some form
of public financing of elections and there are many different variations in the types and forms of
public financing. However, the idea of full public financing is unlikely as it would be very
difficult to fully implement legally. One radical proposal is the abolishment of all private
advertising to the general public in which only publicly financed advertising would be permitted.
Presumably public financing of any form usually requires some form of required attachment that
campaigns and candidates must follow. At this time only modest reforms at campaign finance at
the federal level are palatable by any degree of measurement and modest reforms have been
shown not to effectively reduce the need for campaign funding. Also, previous reforms, such as
BCRA, are being challenged for their constitutionality partially based upon the freedom of
speech issue. Basically, campaign finance reforms do not work at reducing money in politics
and to reducing political debts.
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